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ABSTRACT  
   
This thesis explores the story behind the long effort to achieve Native 
American suffrage in Arizona.  It focuses on two Arizona Supreme Court cases, 
in which American Indians attempted, and were denied the right to register to 
vote.  The first trial occurred in 1928, four years after the Indian Citizenship Act 
granted citizenship to all Native Americans born or naturalized in the United 
States.  The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the Native American plaintiff's 
appeal to register for the electorate, and subsequently disenfranchised Native 
Americans residing on reservations for the next twenty years.   
In 1948, a new generation of Arizona Supreme Court Justices overturned 
the court's previous ruling and finally awarded voting rights to all qualified Native 
Americans in the state.  However, voting rights during the Civil Rights era did not 
necessarily mean equal voting rights.  Therefore, this thesis also investigates how 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 greatly reduced the detrimental effects of voter 
discrimination.  This study examines how national events, like world war and the 
Great Depression influenced the two trials.  In particular, this thesis focuses on 
the construction of political and social power in Arizona as it related to Native 
American voting rights.  In addition, it discusses the evolution of native 
citizenship in the United States at large and for the most part within Arizona.  The 
thesis also considers how the goal of native assimilation into American society 
affected American Indian citizenship, and how a paternalistic and conservative 
American Indian policy of the 1920s greatly influenced the outcome of the first 
ii 
trial.  Another thread of this story is the development of mainstream white views 
of Native Americans.   
Lastly, this thesis identifies the major players of this story, especially the 
American Indian activists and their supporters whose courage and perseverance 
led to an outcome that positively changed the legal rights of generations of Native 
Americans in Arizona for years to come. 
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PREFACE  
The idea for this thesis topic came to me while attending one of the 
Landmark Case Committee meetings in the summer of 2010.  The committee, 
organized under the auspices of the Arizona Historical Records Advisory Board, 
is composed of lawyers, judges, county clerks, historians, and chaired by Dr. 
Melanie Sturgeon, the Arizona State Archivist.  The committee was developed as 
part of the Arizona Superior Court retention schedule with the purpose of creating 
a list of landmark cases from specific criteria outlined by the Arizona Historical 
Records Advisory Board and the Arizona Supreme Court.  Those court cases 
determined to be landmark or historically significant by the committee will be 
preserved in a special archival collection housed at the State Archives in 
downtown Phoenix.  One of the committee members suggested making the 1948 
Arizona Supreme Court case, Harrison v. Laveen, a landmark case.  I asked Dr. 
Sturgeon after the meeting about the trial, and she gave me a brief background.  I 
was shocked that Native Americans in Arizona had not received the right to vote 
until 1948.  Still intrigued, I did some preliminary research on the internet, and 
discovered a transcript to a film on the topic produced by the Intertribal Council 
of Arizona.  I then learned from the transcript, about the 1928 Arizona Supreme 
Court trial, Porter v. Hall, which denied suffrage to Native Americans, and it 
forced me to investigate further.  Next, I performed a quick secondary search on 
the topic, and found very little.  The case was mentioned in almost every book on 
Native American civil rights history, but there was not any true study on the 
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specific trials.  After deciding that this might be a good topic for a thesis project, I 
contacted Dr. Patricia Mariella, the Director of the American Indian Policy 
Institute at Arizona State University.  Dr. Mariella had worked on the film project 
for the Intertribal Council in the 1980s, and she recounted stories of meeting 
Frank Harrison, the Yavapai plaintiff of the 1948 trial.  After researching the topic 
further, I became to realize how impressive a story I had just found.  
 This thesis topic is important to Native American history and civil rights 
history for many reasons.  The study is layered with multiple theoretical concepts 
about humanity, and it provides unique insights into our society, race-relations, 
and most importantly the construction of power.  Lastly, the “major-players” as I 
call them—the people involved in the two court cases and the rest of the story 
truly demonstrate how our diverse our human race is.  The courage it took for 
Peter Porter, Rudolph Johnson, Frank Harrison, and Harry Austin to stand up for 
their rights as individual citizens of the United States of America is truly 
inspiring.  
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Both the 1920s and the 1940s were monumental decades in the 
history of the United States, and quite politically and socially divergent 
from each other.  These two time-periods influenced all aspects of 
society—including American Indian civil rights.  During the 1920s, most 
states had given voting rights to their American Indian constituents, but as 
late as 1948, only two states refused to follow the others and grant 
suffrage to Native Americans.  Arizona was one of those two states to 
disallow the most basic democratic right to American Indians.  Arizona 
also had one of the largest percentages of Native Americans.  Arizona‟s 
story of the process for Native American enfranchisement is layered with 
social, political, and cultural conflicts.  The dissimilar social and political 
climates of the two decades greatly influenced the chances for American 
Indian voting rights in Arizona.  
  A number of conservative political measures directly influenced the legal 
status of minority Americans across the nation in the 1920s.  In 1924, ironically 
the same year as the Asian Exclusion Act, the federal government finally granted 
United States citizenship to Native Americans.  The 1924 Indian Citizenship Act 
was a federal inclusionary measure that changed the legal status of an estimated 
125,000 Native Americans, about one-third of the group‟s population across the 
United States who had not already achieved American citizenship through other 
2 
lawful procedures.
1
  The act gave citizenship status to all American Indians born 
or naturalized in the United States, but the act omitted a highly important aspect 
of citizenship—it did not characterize which citizenship rights Native Americans 
received.
2
  Thus, each state had the authority to determine whether its new 
American Indian citizens had the right to vote.   
Immediately after the passage of the federal act, Arizona legislators and 
lawyers scrambled to determine what should be the legal status of its Native 
American populace.  In a highly politicized moment in Arizona history, some 
state government officials feared that giving the franchise to its large population 
of American Indians would counterbalance the political power in the state.  
According to the 1920 census, Native Americans composed nearly ten percent of 
the total population with almost 33,000 counted individuals and factoring in as the 
largest minority group counted at the time.
3
  In the 1920s, Arizona and New 
Mexico, respectively, had the second and third highest populations of American 
Indians in the United States after the State of Oklahoma, and ironically, both these 
states were the last in the union to enfranchise one of their largest minority 
                                                 
1
Felix S. Cohen, Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, ed. Rennard Strickland 
(Michie, MI: The University of Michigan, 1982), 153; N.D. Houghton, “Wards of the United 
States—Arizona Applications: A Study of the Legal Status of Indians,” University of Arizona 
Bulletin XVI, no. 3 (July 1945): 17.  
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 The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 68 P.L. 175; 68 Cong. Ch. 233; 43 Stat. 253, (June 2, 1924). 
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 Hispanic Americans are not singled out in this count, possibly because they were included under 
the “White” category.  U.S. Bureau of the Census,  Composition and Characteristics of the 
Population by States, 1920, prepared by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1922, 74.  
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groups.
4
  In a conservative state such as Arizona with a high concentration of 
Native Americans—the threat of a shift in the political power was a serious 
concern to those at the top.  By 1928, the Arizona Supreme Court determined that 
its Native American constituency did not have the privilege of franchise in its 
state.  The conservatism of the decade in Arizona cost newly decreed American 
Indian citizens their suffrage in the state.  
Twenty years later in 1948, the legal and social status of Native 
Americans was once again changing within society.  America‟s mainstream 
nature increasingly began to include American Indians.  Arizona was again 
changing ideologically as well.  Liberalism became more prominent in politics 
during the decade.  By 1948, in a rare move, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed 
its 1928 decision on Native American voting rights and granted American Indians 
suffrage in the state.   
This thesis aims to explicate the long path to suffrage for Native 
Americans in Arizona, and to explain the reasons for their prolonged 
disenfranchisement.  The second goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that the 
rejection of Native American voting rights in Arizona was a form of cultural 
hegemony imposed by non-native political leaders.  The dominating white class in 
Arizona used its political power to disenfranchise and further suppress native 
people, and it was only when a positive change in the cultural perception of 
                                                 
4
 American Indian population statistics borrowed from “Original American‟s First Vote,” The 
Literary Digest, September 22, 1928, 17. 
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American Indians by non-natives that enabled legal action to grant Native 
Americans voting rights in Arizona.  Furthermore, this process is layered with 
attributes of power redistribution, federal paternalism, and minority assimilation.  
Borrowing quantitative data already harvested from political scientists, this thesis 
will also aim to provide a historical context of how the essential legislation from 
the Civil Rights Era (after the 1964 Civil Rights Act) affected the voting rights 
and practices of Native American Arizonans.  While doing so, it will also 
demonstrate a newer recognition of the Native American voting bloc in primary 
and general elections over the past few decades. 
Since our nation‟s earliest days, the right to vote as a citizen of the United 
States has been a contested political and human rights issue.  The voting 
electorate has included and excluded several distinct factions of people 
throughout American history, and in the early days of our nation, it was based on 
ascriptive principles such as being a white, Protestant male born or naturalized on 
American soil.
5
  The Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War finally awarded suffrage to African 
American males based on the legal provision that voting rights could “not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude.”6  On August 18, 1920, the ratification of the 
                                                 
5
 Patricia Lee Furnish, “„Aboriginally Yours‟: The Society of American Indians and United States 
Citizenship, 1890—1924,” (PhD dissertation, Norman, OK: The University of Oklahoma, 2005), 
18.  
 
6
 U.S. Constitution, amend.  15, sec. 1. 
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Nineteenth Amendment removed gender as a disqualification to vote, and all 
women born or naturalized in the United States were irrevocably added to the 
electorate.  After a legal battle ensued in the midst of the Vietnam War, the 
Twenty-sixth Amendment lowered the legal voting age to eighteen in recognition 
of disenfranchised eighteen-year-old drafted soldiers risking their lives in war.  
No constitutional amendment ever granted suffrage to American Indians.  Indeed, 
the majority of Native Americans, whose ancestors inhabited American soil long 
before Europeans arrived, were deprived even United States citizenship until after 
World War I. 
The prolonged disenfranchisement of Native Americans in the United 
States has largely been ignored in the historiography of American citizenship and 
political science.  While the literature on Native American history is expanding, 
there is little focus on Native American voting rights.  There is a large amount of 
scholarly discussion and research on similarly related topics such as Native 
American property and water rights and the suffrage of other groups of people 
such as women.  Most studies on American Indian policy and law only bring it up 
once or twice, and if voting rights are mentioned it is usually to make a passing 
point.  There is a very short list of works entirely devoted to American Indian 
voting rights.  Two of the most recent studies focus almost entirely on the 
restoration of equal voting rights to disenfranchised Indians after the 1965 Voting 
6 
Rights Act.
7
  There is no current study on the era in which Native Americans 
obtained voting rights.  
Despite a lack of national recognition on the topic, local historical and 
legal circles have already recognized the path to suffrage for Native Americans in 
Arizona.  For the past several years, Dr. Melanie Sturgeon, Arizona State 
Archivist and the late Dr. Noel Stowe, former Director of the Public History 
Program at Arizona State University worked together to archive Arizona‟s 
landmark legal cases at the Arizona State Archives.  Dr. Sturgeon currently chairs 
the Landmark Case Committee, which includes local Arizona historians, lawyers, 
judges, and county clerks.  The Arizona Historical Records Advisory Board 
developed the Landmark Case Committee as part of the 2006 retention schedule 
of the Arizona Supreme Courts.
8
  Dr. Sturgeon and Dr. Stowe together convinced 
the Arizona Historical Records Advisory Board to formulate a committee 
designed to identify landmark or historically significant court cases for 
preservation at the Arizona State Archives, and available for future research.  The 
Arizona Historical Records Advisory Board and the Arizona Supreme Court 
assembled a list of specific criteria for the identification of landmark cases to be 
conserved.  The committee reviewed hundreds of cases and narrowed the list to a 
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 See Daniel McCool, Susan M. Olson and Jennifer L. Robinson, Native Vote: American Indians, 
the Voting Rights Act, and the Right to Vote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007);  
Laughlin McDonald, American Indians and the Fight for Equal Voting Rights (Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2010). 
 
8
 The Committee was formed by the Arizona Historical Records Advisory Board as per the 
Arizona Code of Judicial Administration Pt 2, Chap 4 Section 3-402 (F) (2) (b) (1). 
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select few.  One of the challenges of the committee was defining a landmark case 
instead of one with just historical significance. 
In spite of this challenge, the committee immediately categorized one case 
as landmark.  The 1948 Harrison et al. v. Laveen Arizona Supreme Court case 
was considered a landmark case first by the committee because it ruled in favor of 
American Indians voting rights in Arizona.  Two American Indian World War II 
veterans from the Fort McDowell Indian Reservation attempted to register to vote 
in Maricopa County and were rejected by the county registrar, Roger Laveen.  
Frank Harrison and Harry Austin sued the County Registrar for the gross injustice 
he had caused to their civil liberties.  The Superior Court upheld the Arizona law 
that disenfranchised Native Americans and the case was appealed to the Arizona 
State Supreme Court.  Finally, in the highest court of the State, Harrison and 
Austin received the vindication they fought for with the strong support of their 
legal team.  Qualified Native American citizens all over Arizona could now vote 
in any election.  However, the Harrison v. Laveen trial was not the first case to 
challenge Arizona law.  Its 1928 predecessor, Porter et al. v. Hall, upheld the 
denial of American Indian voting rights in Arizona at a time when the legal status 
of Native Americans in Arizona and all over the nation was still out of focus.  
 Both cases, Porter v. Hall and Harrison v. Laveen occurred after the 
enormously important Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, which granted citizenship 
to all Native Americans at the federal level.  The failure of the Indian Citizenship 
Act to include suffrage as a tenet of Native American citizenship allowed for 
8 
individual states to determine if American Indians were a part of their electorate 
or not.  This resulted in a slow, piecemeal fight by American Indians and 
American Indian suffrage supporters to argue for this inherent democratic right.  
Finally, by 1948, feelings about civil liberties and rights were changing and the 
famous quote given by Justice Levi Stewart Udall in his legal opinion in Harrison 
v. Laveen reflects that change: “In a democracy suffrage is the most basic civil 
right, since its exercise is the chief means whereby other rights may be 
safeguarded.  To deny the right to vote, where one is legally entitled to do so, is to 
do violence to the principles of freedom and equality.”9  Udall‟s quotation reveals 
how far progress had come for equal rights in America, yet there was much more 
to do.  The process for Native American civil rights in the United States is a long 
story that has its roots in the early nineteenth century.  
A part of this story is the pursuit for equal civil rights.  Once American 
Indians were enabled to vote in Arizona, they entered into a new realm of voter 
discrimination—new challenges found at the ballot box that were similar in style 
and intent to the hardships African Americans faced in the Deep South and 
elsewhere during the Civil Rights era.  Ultimately, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
prohibited legal and extralegal barriers to enfranchisement for all American 
citizens.  
                                                 
9
 Harrison et al. v. Laveen, 5065 (Supreme Court of Arizona, Lexis Nexis Academic, July 15, 
1948), 4. The first sentence of this quote was borrowed by Justice Udall from Felix S. Cohen, 
Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 157.  
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Long before the 1965 Voting Rights Act addressed equal voting rights for 
American Indians and other minorities, the conservative political and social flux 
of the 1920s, and the liberal stability of the 1940s directly affected the civil rights 
of Native Americans.  The new modern era of the 1920s encouraged the 
emergence of new lifestyles and trends.  For example, while consumerism became 
increasingly a greater part of American culture, conservative traditionalists fought 
back with prohibition.  Socially, a renewed sense of nativism supported by white 
supremacy groups forced a decline of immigration.  The 1924 Immigration Act, 
also known as the National Origins Act or the Asian Exclusion Act directly 
resulted from a rise of nativism.  This federal law prohibited the immigration of 
Asian immigrants and reduced the percentages of Southern and Eastern 
immigrants allowed to enter the United States.   
While the United States Congress passed legislation that discriminated 
against immigrants, women made important political gains.  After years of having 
a suppressed citizenship status, women finally succeeded in winning the right to 
vote at the federal level during a period of intense social conservatism.  The 1920s 
were marked with conflicting progressive and conservative ideological views of 
the legal status of American Indians of both genders compared to all non-native 
women.  Despite the passage of the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act, the federal law 
did not guarantee Native American suffrage.  The white dominant class more 
easily accepted women as voters as opposed to Native Americans because women 
10 
lived in the same cultural environment as men, but to whites Native Americans 
were the “Other.”   
Edward Said envisioned the concept of “Othering” in his 1978 book, 
Orientalism.  Said‟s idea of “Othering” describes the dominant class‟s endeavor 
to culturally and socially isolate certain groups of people for the purpose of 
gaining superiority over them.  In the process of “Othering,” the imperialist, 
dominant class views its colonized subjects as exotic and immoral, and 
consequently the subjects become inferior and the lowest members of society.
10
  
Said‟s concept of the “Other” has its influence in white-Indian relations in the 
United States.  According to Said‟s theory, dominant society classified Native 
Americans as the “Other” because of their cultural differences.  Since American 
Indians had their own “foreign” culture, suffrage was more difficult for this group 
that existed on the fringe of American society to achieve than for white women. 
Bias politics became one of the reasons Native Americans faced 
challenges to securing enfranchisement in Arizona during the 1920s.  Since 
statehood in 1912, the Democratic Party enjoyed local political dominance in the 
state.
11
  However, political power shifted in the state during the 1920s when the 
Republican Party secured some important elected seats.  For example, the results 
of 1920 state election gained the GOP the majority in the Arizona Senate, and a 
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 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 65-67.  
 
11
 David R. Berman, Arizona Politics and Government: The Quest for Autonomy, Democracy, and 
Development (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 41, 47.  
 
11 
near tie in the House.
12
  The Arizona electorate also voted in Republican 
candidates for governor in 1920 and 1928.
13
  The 1928 election was a crushing 
blow to the Democratic Party when the republican candidate, John Calhoun 
Phillips, ousted long-serving democratic Governor George W. P. Hunt from 
office.
14
  In spite of the political gains of the GOP, the Democratic Party 
continued to enjoy majority party status in Arizona throughout the 1920s.
15
  The 
competitiveness between the two parties in the 1920s resulted in an unfounded 
fear from some members of the Democratic Party that their political control of the 
state could waver if the potentially new voting bloc of Native Americans were 
added to the electorate.  Believing the new American Indian voting class would 
collectively vote for republican candidates, some Democrats urged for the 
disenfranchisement of Native Americans in 1928.  
The Democratic Party, however, dominated the 1930s, especially in the 
1930 and 1932 election years.
16
  In those two years, Arizona followed national 
voting trends, specifically in 1932 with the election of President Franklin D. 
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 Ibid., 47.  
 
13
 Ibid. George W. P. Hunt served Arizona as governor during 1912 to 1917 and for six 
consecutive years between 1923 and 1928.    
 
14
 Hunt returned to the campaign trail in 1930, and won that year‟s election for Arizona governor.  
It was his seventh and final term as Arizona governor.   
 
15
 Ibid.  
 
16
 Ibid., 48.  
 
12 
Roosevelt.
17
  However, the disparity between elected Democrats and Republicans 
in the Arizona State Legislature was especially evident between 1933 and 1951 
with the overall landslide representation of the Democratic Party between those 
years.
18
  The conservative nature of the Democratic Party, relatively in complete 
local power, allowed for the continuation of American Indian disenfranchisement 
in Arizona.   
Nationally, the Democratic Party, however, began to change ideologically, 
and taking more liberal stances on policy-making.  It was the beginning of a 
Democratic Party political realignment that did not begin to take any effect until 
the early 1930s.
19
  In Arizona, conservative Democrats faced intraparty conflict as 
more liberal Democrats took control of the party by the 1950s and 1960s.
20
  
Meanwhile, the Republican Party drew more and more support from conservative 
Democrats.
21
  By the time Frank Harrison and Harry Austin attempted to register 
in 1947, the Democratic Party in Arizona had already begun to realign 
ideologically, which may have contributed to the outcome of the trial.  Ultimately, 
it was the momentous catalyst of World War II that finally ensured the 
enfranchisement of Native Americans in Arizona.  
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18
 Ibid.  
 
19
 James L. Sunquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political 
Parties in the United States (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 198-199. 
20
 Berman, Arizona Politics and Government, 51-54. 
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World war almost entirely absorbed the 1940s.  The Second World War 
had a tremendous impact on national and local communities throughout the globe.  
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Americans generally felt united in 
a greater cause.  Men and women of all backgrounds volunteered their service and 
their lives for a higher purpose to win the war, thus defending Americanism—
what it was to be an American was paramount. 
World War II was a world-changing event that had its effects in Arizona.  
The war effort introduced a new wave of nationalism in America.  People of all 
backgrounds came together against a great evil.  The pride of being an American 
countered the horrific and tragic events overseas.  An overwhelming sense of 
patriotism caused millions of Americans to contribute their service, their 
donations, and their lives to the war effort.  Native Americans from tribes all over 
the country enlisted in droves with the United State military just as they had in 
World War I.  The community driven, nationalistic atmosphere of the 1940s 
allowed for another restructuring of power within Arizona society.  In general, 
white Americans began to perceive Native Americans in another light.  There was 
an incipient sense of acceptance of American Indians, especially those who had 
fought alongside their white comrades in the war.  This mainstream attitudinal 
change towards American Indians in Arizona resulted in the positive outcome of 
the Harrison v. Laveen trial.  Arizona‟s social and political climate during World 
War II enabled another restructuring of power within the state.  
14 
The story of Native American voting rights in Arizona is essentially a 
story about power structures and race relations.  French theorist, Michel Foucault 
provides a greater understanding of power structures within societies.  He 
described power constructs using an analogy in his theoretical piece, Madness and 
Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason.  Foucault portrays the 
establishment of the Hôspital Général of Paris in 1656 to care for the sick, 
indigent, and mentally ill.  He argued that the founding of this institution was not 
necessarily for medical purposes, but rather as a tool by the French government to 
impose authority over the lower classes.  Foucault writes, “A quasi-absolute 
sovereignty, jurisdiction without appeal, a writ of execution against which nothing 
can prevail—the Hôspital Général is a strange power that the King establishes 
between the police and the courts, at the limits of the law: a third order of 
repression.
22
  The Hôspital Général served a new purpose for the government of 
France—to separate and control those individuals deemed unworthy of societal 
interaction.  Before the Hôspital Général was established, mentally insane 
individuals were free to carry on their lives within their communities just as 
everyone else did.  With the introduction of the Hôspital Général, the institution‟s 
directors and doctors then had full authority to pull individuals they considered 
insane and place them within the confines of the hospital.  These individuals, 
separated from their communities, were now institutionalized and the right to 
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 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1965), 40.  
15 
freedom that they once enjoyed was gone.  The analogy of the Hôspital Général 
has served its theoretical purpose in many academic disciplines investigating 
power structures.  Indeed, the analogy has its place in native/white relations in the 
United States and in the State of Arizona.  
The disenfranchisement by one group of people over another is a form of 
political suppression or theoretical confinement—a type of power structure that is 
illustrated in Foucault‟s analogy of the Hôspital Général.  By eliminating the 
power produced in the vote, the dominate group can control the weaker and 
voiceless faction.  The inability to respond rightfully to how a government 
presides over the life of an individual is suggestive of the freedom taken away 
when one is imprisoned or institutionalized.  When white government officials 
determine that the legal status of Native Americans does not include suffrage, 
then the power structure in play also involves racial and cultural dominance. 
White superiority is the ideological opinion that white people are more 
advanced in all aspects of life over non-whites, and it is also an instrument to 
formulate a power structure by the white dominating class.  The dogma of white 
superiority was also transparent in white-Indian relations.  White government 
officials viewed themselves as guardians over their Indian wards.  This concept of 
the guardian/ward relationship led to an abuse of power at the federal level.  
Because of their status as wards of the United States government, white 
government officials tended to conclude that Native Americans were helpless and 
needed the oversight and control of the federal government through the Office of 
16 
Indian Affairs.  The guardian-ward relationship between white government 
officials and Native Americans is supporting evidence of how ingrained white 
superiority was in American white culture.  Fundamentally, human beings have 
always thrived in power structures, and the guardian-ward relationship between 
whites and Native Americans more than suggests another example of one group 
of people forcing dominance over another.  
With political and social progress comes an opportunity for the 
rebalancing of power.  Progress, in the case of Native American voting rights was 
an incremental process towards achievement.  The 1924 Indian Citizenship Act 
contributed to a restructuring of power in Arizona.  Once the federal government 
recognized all born or naturalized Native Americans as American citizens, 
Arizona officials scrambled to determine the legal status of Native Americans in 
their state.  The ultimate question was whether Arizona Native Americans had the 
right to vote according to the Arizona constitution.  While Native Americans in 
Arizona benefitted in some ways from their newfound American citizenship, the 
progress of enhancing their citizenship status to include voting rights actually 
slowed down.  The 1924 Indian Citizenship Act provided an opportunity for 
American Indian suffrage in Arizona.  Initially, white government officials in 
Arizona supported the enfranchisement of Native Americans, but largely their 
opinions changed once the next general election drew near.  The potential voting 
bloc of Native Americans was a threat to some white government officials in 
Arizona.  The 1928 Porter v. Hall trial was essentially a mechanism used by some 
17 
white government officials in Arizona to maintain the current power structure.  
Those seeking to disenfranchise Native Americans during the trial used the 
paternalistic guardian-ward argument to effect their desired outcome.  After the 
trial‟s end, American Indians were denied the right to politically participate in 
their own government, were unrepresented and consequently more oppressed by 
the prevention of their right to vote in Arizona.  The consequence of depriving 
Native Americans suffrage made them second-class citizens in Arizona.   
 One of the layers to this story is the power of paternalism that white 
government officials held over American Indians.  Paternalism, as is discussed in 
this work, was an extension of federal Indian relations carried over into 
mainstream thinking.  At the end of the nineteenth century, the vast majority of 
United States government officials and the Protestant class of Christian reformers 
believed in a form of paternalism in which Indian policy forced assimilation upon 
native peoples.  Assimilation included the moral, social, political and most 
importantly the cultural values that the Christian reformers wished to impose 
upon the American Indian individual.  Reform movements as the Indian Rights 
Association and the Lake Mohonk Conferences of the Friends of the Indians 
believed that such programs would ultimately transform the American Indian into 
a United States citizen fully capable of handling his/her own affairs.  The 
Christian reformers who heavily pushed for the assimilation of Indians were 
representatives of a fast growing and increasingly politically puissant 
constituency of the Protestant American nineteenth century population.  Historian 
18 
Francis Paul Prucha writes, “When they spoke, they spoke for a large majority of 
the nation, expressing views that were widely held, consciously or 
unconsciously.”23  Their ultimate goal was to end Indian tribalism and, in its 
place, develop a sense of individualism.  Protestant Christian reformers of the late 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century had effectively changed the 
United States government‟s Indian policy and had successfully lobbied for reform 
programs like allotment, which supported the individualization and 
Americanization of Native Americans.
24
   
 Robert Berkhoffer explained in his book, The White Man’s Indian, the 
white American‟s strident conviction of individualizing the Native American for 
the purpose of assimilation.  Berkhoffer theorized that the liberal ideals of rugged 
individualism that defined Americanism sharply contrasted with the 
communalistic values of Indian tribalism.  Therefore, the dominant white class 
believed it was imperative to culturally assimilate American Indians with the 
values of individualism in order to mark them as true Americans.
25
  Part of the 
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assimilation process for Christian reformers was to make Indians into American 
citizens.  In order to achieve complete assimilation, thousands of Native 
Americans were subject to government-sponsored education programs, land 
allotment policies and even name changing.  Granting citizenship to American 
Indians for the promotion of individualism was one approach in debasing the 
cultural values of Indian tribalism.  However, awarding citizenship did not 
necessarily mean providing the Native American with a voice to speak out for or 
against his/her new government, nor did it necessarily mean governmental 
representation for the new American Indian citizen.  The access to suffrage for 
many Native Americans continued to be blocked.   
Casting a vote is demonstrative of the power an individual has in his/her 
democratic society—it is the power to participate politically in one‟s government.  
The deprival of the vote removes any power the individual has in determining 
how he/she can be governed.  This concept of the disenfranchised individual can 
be linked to subaltern theory.  Subaltern theory describes the power roles of the 
subaltern—the individual or group of individuals that is outside of the hegemonic 
power structure.  Subaltern theory is a theoretical offshoot of Edward Said‟s 
postcolonial concept of “Othering.”  Said‟s notions of the Other were expanded 
by postcolonial theorists Antonio Gramsci of Italy and Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak of India to create the concept of the subaltern.  Spivak depicts the 
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subaltern as, “all that is not elite.”26  Her line of thought concerning subaltern 
theory focuses more on the question, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” which is the 
speculative title of her monumental essay published in 1988.
27
  In her essay, 
Spivak elaborates on the controversial example of the Hindu sati funerary 
practice, which involves the suicide of Indian widows.  She ultimately concludes 
that the marginalized subaltern cannot speak, because Western perspectives 
ignore the point of view of the Indian widow, herself a subaltern.
28
  Spivak 
philosophizes that once the subaltern can speak, then “the subaltern is not a 
subaltern any more.”29  
Gyanendra Pandey, a distinguished history professor from Emory 
University, crystallizes subaltern theory to include the paradox of citizenship.  
Viewing the subaltern as a “political construct,” Pandey created the subaltern 
citizen.
30
  He states that, “the term „citizen‟ as a modifier for „subaltern‟, [is] an 
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indicator of the political quality of all subalternity (and all dominance).”31  
Regarding the term citizen Pandey describes it,  
…first as the bearer of the legal right to residence, political participation, 
state support and protection in a given territory; the second, a more diffuse 
sense of acceptance in, and acceptance of, an existing order and existing 
social arrangements.
32
 
Thus, the marrying of subaltern and the politicized citizen provides for a new 
paradigmatic structure in thinking this discussion about subaltern theory.  With 
Pandey‟s view of the subaltern existing in a community environment where 
personal and social growth are achievable, there is now a possibility for the 
subaltern to reach its full potential.
33
  On this subject, he explains,  
The claim is rather about historical agency broadly defined, and about 
belonging in a society and in its self-construction.  That is to say, it is 
about the living of individual and collective lives, and the limitations on 
that living: about the potential for life and creativity in given historical 
circumstances, and the restriction of that potential.
34
 
It is the “restriction of that potential,” as Pandey writes, which forms the 
subalternity of the subject.  Given what we know about constructions of 
subalternity and citizenship, it becomes apparent that these theoretical paradigms 
can be applied to the race relations between the Native American/Euro-American 
dichotomy.  Pandey‟s concept of the subaltern citizen is applicable to the 
disenfranchised Native American in Arizona before 1948.  American Indians in 
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the state were limited from their right to vote and thus restricted from 
participating in their own government before the 1948 Arizona Supreme Court 
trial of Harrison v. Laveen.  Since American Indians were deprived of the right as 
citizens to engage in the “self construction” of their own government, then 
according to Pandey‟s definition, they were subaltern citizens.  
Another theoretical model that is relevant in the history of Native 
American voting rights in Arizona is Glenn Loury‟s definition of racial stigma.  In 
his 2003 article, Racial Stigma: Toward a New Paradigm for Discrimination 
Theory, Boston University economics professor, Glenn C. Loury elaborates on the 
conceptual distinction between racial discrimination and racial stigma.
35
  
Speaking primarily of African American race relations, Loury asserts that, 
“[r]acial discrimination has to do with how blacks are treated, while racial stigma 
is concerned with how black people are perceived.”36  While Loury employs his 
definition of racial stigma towards an argument about the economic 
discrimination against African Americans, his definition of racial stigma is 
applicable to the attitude of white governmental officials towards Native 
Americans in Arizona during the twentieth century, and how it influenced 
American Indians suffrage.   
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Native Americans‟ struggle for voting rights, let alone equal voting rights, 
has been a long and tedious process since the formation of the United States, and 
a process in which the majority of Native Americans were never involved.  For 
years, white American officials squabbled over the legal status of American 
Indians.  A large issue concerning the legal status of American Indians was the 
determination of their citizenship with the United States.  What rights should they 
be afforded and which denied?  Despite the fact that Native American tribes were 
culturally distinct from each other and, most importantly, from European-
Americans, all tribes and their members were lumped together into what was 
known as the “Indian Question.”  The “Indian Question” as it is so called, was 
largely Jeffersonian era recognition by European-American politicos that a 
necessity to integrate all American Indians into the larger American society was 
looming.  By the end of the nineteenth century, wars between the tribes and the 
United States military had almost entirely ended.  Simply, treaties were finalized 
and reservations set aside.  Yet, there seemed an endless number of issues to 
resolve such as taxes and land rights.  For many government administrators, the 
most difficult matter was how to incorporate these individuals into American 
society.  The need to “civilize” Native Americans was at the forefront of the 
“Indian Question.”  A part of the solution to civilize American Indians was to 
make them United States citizens.  
24 
History of Native American Citizenship in the United States to 1924 
For most of the nineteenth century, Native Americans were not eligible to 
become citizens of the United States.  This exclusion began with the writing of 
the Constitution.  Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution simply stated that for the 
distribution of representatives and direct taxes for each state, “Indians not taxed” 
would not be counted.  Native Americans were not considered within the 
governance of the United States and therefore not taxable.  The confusion of how 
Native Americans related to United States society was also evident in Article 1, 
Section 8.  In this clause, Congress had the power to “regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”  The 
relationship between the United States government and American Indian tribes 
was uncertain, yet the former at this point deduced it had no authority over the 
latter.
37
  
The seemingly extrajurisdictional relationship between the United States 
government and American Indian tribes changed in the 1830s with a set of three 
Supreme Court cases known as the Marshall Trilogy.  Chief Justice John Marshall 
tried to explain the nebulous relationship between the United States government 
and Native American tribes, but his decisions within the three trials were 
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contradictory and confusing.
38
  His statements in these three trials would have 
lasting effects on the legal status of Native Americans for the next century.   
The issue of the sovereignty of Native American tribes came to a boiling 
point in 1828.  That year the State of Georgia enacted laws that drastically 
reduced the rights of Cherokee Indian residents within the state.  These actions by 
the State of Georgia were an effort to force Cherokees to move from their tribal 
lands.  The Cherokee occupied a territory that was rich in resources and the state 
government of Georgia wanted free access to those resources.  The Cherokee 
Nation sued the State of Georgia, claiming the state had no jurisdiction over their 
tribe, but their complaints fell on deaf ears at the Supreme Court.  In the 1831 
Supreme Court case Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall pointed 
out that the clause in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, mentioned above, 
described Indian tribes as discrete from foreign nations and states.  In order to 
explain the distinct status of Indian tribes with relation to the United States 
government, Marshall concluded that Indians tribes “be denominated domestic 
dependent nations.”39  Marshall went further to describe this special relationship 
adding,  
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, 
which must take effect in point of possession when their right of 
possession ceases.  Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage.  Their 
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward of his guardian.  
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its 
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power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as 
their great father.  They and their county are considered by foreign 
nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the 
sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire 
their lands, or to form a political connexion [sic] with them, would be 
considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.
40
  
 
Justice Marshall concluded that an “Indian tribe or nation within the United States 
is not a foreign state in the sense of the constitution, and cannot maintain an 
action in the courts of the United States.”41  Therefore, the Supreme Court denied 
the injunction.  
In 1832, Justice Marshall presented his opinion to the court for the 
Worcester v. Georgia Supreme Court trial.  The previous year, Cherokee 
missionary, Samuel A. Worcester, a non-Indian, was arrested for living in 
Cherokee territory without a permit or taking an oath of allegiance to the State of 
Georgia according to state law.  This Supreme Court case along with its 
predecessor, Cherokee v. Georgia attempted to describe the legal status of the 
tribe and its relationship with the United States.  Marshall concluded that the 
Cherokee Nation was its own “distinct community, occupying its own territory, 
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no 
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent 
of the Cherokees themselves…”42  Since Marshall now believed that the 
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Cherokee Nation had sovereign power to determine who could and could not 
inhabit their land (except for any treaties or by an act of Congress) the Court 
overturned Worcester‟s conviction. Georgia had no jurisdiction over the Cherokee 
territory that overlapped the state.  This ruling only further confused the special 
relationship between Native American tribal nations and the United States 
Government.  
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution passed just after the Civil 
War in June 1866.  Adopted from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Article I Section 2 
of the amendment stated, “That all persons born in the United States, and not 
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to 
be citizens of the United States.”43  After a heated debate on the Senate floor, 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment eventually omitted the phrase “excluding 
Indians not taxed,” but the phrase remained in Section 2 stripping all non-taxed 
Native Americans of any governmental representation.
44
  Despite the omission of 
the phrase “excluding Indians not taxed” in the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment declaring, the citizenship of all those born on American soil, Native 
Americans were still not considered United States citizens.  
The debate over the legal status of Native Americans continued.  In 1869, 
Congress established the Board of Indian Commissioners to serve as a counsel to 
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the United States federal government on American Indian policy.  The first report 
of the Board of Indian Commissioners presented a solution to the “Indian 
Question” other than the extermination of all Native Americans:  
The legal status of the uncivilized Indians should be that of wards of the 
government; the duty of the latter being to protect them, to educate them 
in industry, the arts of civilization, and the principles of Christianity; 
elevate them to the rights of citizenship, and to sustain and clothe them 
until they can support themselves.
45
 
 
The concept that Native Americans were “wards of the government” harkened 
back to the language used by Justice Marshall in the Cherokee v. Georgia trial.  
The Board of Commissioners however, now believed that the federal government 
should take a more active role in the livelihood of their Native Americans 
“wards.”  
 In his 1874 annual report, Commissioner Edward P. Smith of the Indian 
Office presented new policy to the House for consideration regarding Native 
Americans affairs.  Smith believed that all Native Americans whether on or off 
reservations should now be under state and/or federal jurisdiction.  He argued that 
individual Native Americans needed the protection of law from other Indians and 
from their white neighbors.  Smith‟s report outlined a growing need for legislation 
to police Native Americans and secondly to “encourage… individual 
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improvement.”46  Smith categorized his proposals under the umbrella term, 
“Qualified Citizenship.”47  To “encourage individual improvement,” Smith 
recommended the following, 
(1.) By providing a way into citizenship for such as desire it. 
(2.) By providing for holding lands in severalty by allotment for 
occupation, and for    patents with an ultimate fee, but inalienable 
for a term of years.
48
  
 
The “qualified citizenship” that Commissioner Smith desired for Native 
Americans was a start towards a new line of policy regarding the legal status of 
Native Americans in the United States known as conditional citizenship.   
 For most of the nineteenth century two distinct policies to settle the 
“Indian Question” dominated the American political landscape.  The first policy 
to “exterminate” the Indian race judged harshly against the Native American 
populace.  Whites who reasoned for this solution believed so strongly in the 
degradation of American Indians as a people that sharing land or resources with 
them was impossible.  The numerous Indian wars that spanned the continent 
demonstrated this first line of thinking.  The second federal policy for the “Indian 
Question” was to create reservation systems and eventually assimilate Native 
Americans into the larger United States society.  At the end of the nineteenth 
                                                 
46
 U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, November 1, 1874, by Edward P. Smith, House Executive Document no. 1, 43d Cong., 2d 
sess., serial 1639, 326.  
 
47
 Ibid. 
 
48
 Ibid. 
 
30 
century, reservations served as a place for government agencies like the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs to inflict assimilation policies upon American Indians.  Scholar, 
Francis Paul Prucha writes, “The reservations were a controlled society in which, 
the sooner the better, tribal ways would fall before the ways of the dominant 
white society.”49  The second policy in favor of the “civilizing” of American 
Indians was the first stepping-stone towards Native American citizenship and 
enfranchisement.  Yet for most of the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
designation of citizenship was on a conditional basis and voting rights not even 
considered.   
 The 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie between the Sioux and the Indian Peace 
Commission was one of the first of many policies that endorsed conditional 
citizenship for Native Americans.  The last paragraph of Article Six of the treaty 
declared any Sioux that obtained a land patent would become a United States 
citizen.  Whether or not a Sioux could vote in an election was unclear, but the 
treaty did stipulate that the Sioux had a form of dual citizenship between the 
Sioux tribe and the United States.  The Treaty of Fort Laramie was exceptional 
for many policymakers believed that Native Americans had to abandon all 
affiliations with their tribe in order to become American citizens.
50
  Even then, 
Native Americans were still deprived of all of the rights and privileges of 
citizenship.  
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 The test case for voting rights came in 1880, when Native American John 
Elk attempted to register to vote in Omaha, Nebraska and was denied by 
Registrar Charles Wilkins.  The Supreme Court reviewed the case four years later 
in 1884.  The trial‟s outcome was significant in further determining the nebulous 
legal status of Native Americans in the United States.  John Elk argued that since 
he had abandoned his tribal affiliation and lived in Omaha among white residents, 
he was entitled to the full rights of citizenship including voting privileges under 
the provisions of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifteenth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that since the United States 
never recognized Elk as a citizen he was therefore not a citizen and not entitled to 
vote.
51
  Despite the provision in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment 
which stated that “…all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens…,” it was the second section of the 
article that finally determined Elk‟s and all other American Indians‟ legal 
status.
52
  Since he did not pay taxes and was not represented according to the 
second section of the Fourteenth Amendment, Elk was considered equivalent to 
“... the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of 
that government, or the children born within the United States, of ambassadors or 
other public ministers of foreign nations.”53   
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 Three years after the landmark decision in the Elk v. Wilkins Supreme 
Court case, American Indian policy regarding the “Indian Question” changed 
when Congress adopted the Dawes General Allotment Act in 1887.  The act 
fulfilled the two wishes for the “encouragement of individual improvement” 
proposed by Indian Office Commissioner Edward P. Smith in his 1874 annual 
report.  The Dawes General Allotment Act mainly sought to fracture tribal 
relations by allotting in severalty parcels within Indian reservations to those 
individual Indians willing to sever ties with their tribe.  Furthermore, the Dawes 
Act stipulated that every Indian be allotted a certain sized parcel within the 
reservation depending on their social status.  Once all the available land was 
divided up between each individual Native American, the rest of the remaining 
land was sold off after negotiating its value with the tribe.  The U.S. Treasury held 
the profit of the surplus land for the use of the tribe but Congress often allocated 
the reserve for the Americanization of tribal members through education and 
other welfare programs.
54
  Reformers in support of the act believed that by 
breaking up tribal relations, individual Indians would assimilate more easily into 
the larger American society.  Individualism included self-support which the 
reformers wished allotment of Indian lands in severalty would provide.
55
  The 
Dawes Act garnered another aspect of paternalism that radiated from it; after the 
patent for the allotment was issued, the new Native American owner was then 
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liable to the state and territorial laws of which he or she resided.
56
  The final 
additive to this prescription for integration was to grant citizenship rights to all 
those Indians who had “voluntarily taken up, within said limits, his residence 
separate and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of 
civilized life.”57  The Dawes Act effectively linked land ownership with 
citizenship.  The federal government enacted the bill after President Cleveland 
signed it into law, quickly dividing several reservations.  The rate of the sale and 
the allotment of tribal lands troubled even Senator Dawes.  At the following 1887 
Lake Mohonk Conference organized by the Friends of the Indians American 
Indian reform association, Dawes stated, “There is no danger but this will come 
most rapidly—too rapidly, I think, —the greed and hunger and thirst of the white 
man for the Indian‟s land is almost equal to his „hunger and thirst for 
righteousness.‟”58  The formula for the “Indian Question” was for the time being 
resolved in the minds of the Christian reformers, but the act‟s damages to tribal 
communities would have lasting effects.  Nevertheless, all of the harm the act 
inflicted on tribal communities, the Dawes Act had for the first time set up by law 
an avenue for Native Americans to become citizens.    
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 Motion by motion, Native Americans slowly gained citizenship rights in 
the United States under conditional circumstances, but the road to full citizenship 
with voting rights would not end until well into the twentieth century.  On March 
3, 1901, Congress amended the Dawes Act to make citizens of all of the Native 
Americans living in the Indian Territory.  Despite the positive direction of this 
amendment, the 1906 Burke Act made citizenship more difficult for Native 
Americans to obtain under the Dawes Act.  The Burke Act stipulated that Native 
Americans applying for allotments after May 8, 1906 could not receive 
citizenship status at the establishment of the twenty-five year trust period for 
allotments, but instead at the end.  The Christian reformers ardently rejected the 
Burke Act of 1906, but its passage was the first evident point in which Christian 
reformers had a decline of influence with legislators.
59
  Yet by the following year, 
after the termination of the Indian Territory and the establishment of Oklahoma‟s 
statehood, the Oklahoma Enabling Act granted citizenship to all Native 
Americans living in the former Indian Territory.
60
  
 Native American activist groups also supported American Indian 
citizenship.  In response to paternalistic policies like the Dawes General 
Allotment Act, a new pan-Indian movement emerged during the Progressive Era.  
At the forefront of this movement was the Society of American Indians, founded 
in 1911.  The Society of American Indians was a secular group organized by 
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American Indians for the promotion of progressive values of education and better 
welfare, and crystallized by a renewed sense of Indian race consciousness.
61
  Most 
importantly, the society‟s leaders adopted the progressive ideal of accepting 
American Indian acculturation into the larger American society.
62
  Members 
sought to integrate into the modern American society, while still embracing their 
Indian background—an active attempt to change their societal status away from 
wardship.
63
  In the words of historian Patricia Lee Furnish, “The SAI aspired to be 
the native voice of that civilizing process and to shape the institutions that made 
the process legitimate.”64  Most of the association‟s leaders were educated and 
professional American Indian men—a group of individuals who represented the 
highest potential of their race.
65
  Citizenship for all Native Americans became one 
of the primary objectives of the Society of American Indians, especially with the 
start of World War I.
66
  Dr. Charles Eastman, Dr. Carlos Montezuma and Father 
Philip Gordon, prominent members of the Society of American Indians, openly 
advocated for Indian citizenship during speaking tours in 1919.
67
  However, 
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Eastman and Montezuma‟s advocacy for the dissolution of the Indian Bureau 
overshadowed the association‟s cause for American Indian citizenship.  The 
leaders argued that the agency‟s paternalistic nature caused Native American 
hardships.
68
  The attack on the agency, however, would ultimately doom the 
group.
69
  By the 1920s, the association declined in influence and broke up, but its 
impact on the Pan-Indian movement and American Indian civil rights was felt in 
other newer associations throughout the rest of the twentieth century.
70
  
 During World War I, many Native Americans felt it was their duty to 
contribute to the war effort.  The willingness for some Native Americans to 
participate in the war effort even though they were not required was a patriotic 
demonstration of their bond to the United States and their capability to manage 
their own individual affairs as potential loyal American citizens.
71
  They donated 
to the Red Cross, bought war bonds, and added to the production of food reserves.  
However, the most important contribution to the war effort was the military 
service of some ten to twelve thousand Native Americans across the nation.
72
  
Cato Sells, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs during the war, insisted that 
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Native Americans were integrated into military units rather than having their own 
separate groups.  In viewing the Indian soldier, Sells believed that he should be 
treated, “as the equal and comrade of every man who assails autocracy and 
ancient might, and to come home with a new light in his face and a clearer 
conception of the democracy in which he may participate and prosper.”73  In 
recognition of their service to the United States, Congress passed an act on 
November 6, 1919 granting citizenship to all American Indians who served in the 
United States military during World War I and received an honorable discharge.  
Sells urged reservation superintendents to spread the word about the new act to 
their constituents.
74
  This act was a large stepping-stone for Native Americans to 
achieve American citizenship; however, a provision of the act made it very 
difficult for those honorably discharged Native American veterans to obtain their 
right to American citizenship.  The act specified that World War I Native 
American veterans had to prove their identity and their honorable discharge from 
the military before a “court of competent jurisdiction” in order to acquire United 
States citizenship.
75
  The process proved difficult for many American Indian 
veterans and Anthropologist Susan Applegate Krouse, in her study North 
American Indians in the Great War, argues that the vast majority of American 
Indian veterans were unaware of the citizenship act or of its process of 
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application.  She furthermore, attests that there was a large amount of uncertainty 
and confusion between American Indian veterans and government officials about 
the new legal status of American Indian World War I veterans.
76
  
 As aforementioned, the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act was the one federal 
action that affected the lives of thousands of Native Americans around the United 
States.  The act granted citizenship to all Native Americans born or naturalized in 
the United States, but it did not specify what specific rights came along with this 
new legal status.  Because the act was vague in this respect, each state had the 
authority to fill in the details.  Only a few states like Arizona established that 
their new Native American citizens were ineligible to acquire the right of 
suffrage.  Arizona state officials believed in the doctrine of paternalism and used 
the guardian/ward argument to obstruct American Indians in their state from 
participating in governmental affairs. 
 The 1924 Indian Citizenship Act provided access to American Indians all 
over the United States to American citizenship.  The act bestowed American 
citizenship status to the remaining approximately one-third of the American 
Indian population who had been unable to obtain it through other legal 
measures.
77
  The solution to the “Indian Question” of “civilizing” Native 
Americans was well under way in the early part of the twentieth century, but the 
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definition to Arizona lawmakers of what full citizenship rights for Native 
Americans meant was unclear.   
 The nebulous legal status of American Indians in Arizona occurred 
because Arizona lawmakers feared a redistribution of power in Arizona.  There 
was, however, much more to the story.  On the political level, conservative 
government officials believed that the introduction of such a large minority into 
the electorate would offset established political party bases.  On a racial level, the 
story of American Indian suffrage in Arizona brings up issues of white 
superiority and dominance over Native Americans.  As always in the history of 
humankind, the socially dangerous situation of one class determining the legal 
rights of another is equivalent to political and social oppression.  In Arizona, 
white government officials could be characterized in this sense as the oppressors, 
and Native Americans the oppressed.  Lastly, the paternalistic nature of American 
Indian cultural assimilation placed values of Americanism over tribalism.   
40 
CHAPTER 2 
DISTINCT DENIAL 
Certainly, the passage of his Indian Citizenship bill in 1924 was one of the 
hallmark political moves of New York Representative Homer P. Snyder‟s 
political career.  Before the bill‟s ratification by Congress, did Snyder ever dream 
of the legal, social, and political ramifications that would follow?  As Chairman 
of Indian Affairs in Congress, did he ever realize the complexity and challenges 
that the bill created when turning all American Indians into American citizens?  
Did he ever consider the fact that American citizenship could undermine tribal 
citizenship and vice versa?  The Indian Citizenship Act was only seventy-two 
words in comparison to the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, which was roughly 
forty-eight pages, but its impact on generations of American Indians was just as 
immeasurable.  
On July 2, 1924, one month after the passage of the 1924 Indian 
Citizenship Act, Arizona Attorney General John W. Murphy sent a circular to all 
the county attorneys in response to a number of queries as to the act‟s effects on 
American Indian enfranchisement in the state.  Murphy sent his opinion to the 
Arizona Republic for publication, and it was copied in full within the article.  
Citing federal HR Bill 6355, Murphy at first agreed with the provisions of the act 
regarding American Indian voting rights; “Being citizens their right to vote cannot 
be abridged or impaired by state legislation, but such right is absolute.  Having the 
41 
right to vote, they have the right to register as voters under the laws of the state.”78  
Murphy also concluded that the state did not have the jurisdiction to establish 
polling and registration centers on reservations, but that it was necessary to 
redraw current voting precincts to include reservations, and that polling centers be 
made available and near those reservations.
79
  Having received a copy of 
Murphy‟s opinion on the matter, Commissioner Charles H. Burke of the Office of 
Indian Affairs in a letter to Arizona Congressman Carl Hayden, encouraged all 
the county attorneys to act upon Murphy‟s decision to redraw voting precincts 
with the inclusion of reservations.  Burke pushed for immediate action upon 
Murphy‟s part in order to evade allegations of inequity by Native Americans or 
their supporters.  He wrote, “This will avoid a feeling on their part that they are 
being improperly treated or discriminated against.”80  Burke then pressed that the 
state actually take governmental action to set up polling centers on reservations in 
the near future and offered any assistance from the Office of Indian Affairs to do 
so.  Hayden passed Commissioner Burke‟s letter on to Attorney General Murphy.  
Immediately after the passage of the Indian Citizenship bill in Congress, Attorney 
General Murphy initially agreed with its proviso that American Indians had the 
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right to vote under state laws, but it seems his attitude on the subject changed with 
the influence of other governmental officials.  
Just days following the publication of his opinion in the Arizona Republic, 
Arizona Attorney General John W. Murphy continued to respond to inquiries 
regarding the state qualifications for its electorate.  The State of Arizona in 1924 
had five requirements for voter registration eligibility.  According to paragraph 
2879 of the Civil Code, an Arizona citizen had to have the following 
qualifications to register to vote for any election:  
1. Of the age of 21 years.   
2. A resident of the state one year and of the county and precinct 30 days.   
3. Who is able to read the Constitution of the United States in the English 
     language. 
4. Who is not an idiot or an insane person.  
5. Who shall not have been convicted of treason or felony.
81
 
 
In response to a letter from Frank M. Gold, an attorney in Flagstaff, Arizona, 
Murphy wrote that, in his opinion, no American Indian could register to vote who 
could not read the United States Constitution.  Reading between the lines, Murphy 
implied that this third requirement of the electorate would undoubtedly block the 
registration of illiterate Native Americans.  Since literacy was a component of 
civilizing American Indians, no “uncivilized” Native American would be able to 
vote in any Arizona election.  Furthermore, Murphy offered his thoughts on the 
consequences of enfranchising the American Indian populace: “Doesn‟t it occur 
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to you, Frank, that in most cases if any ulterior influence is to be exerted over the 
Indian that it might come from the political party that is in National control, 
which at this time happens to be the Republican party?”82  This last sentence 
demonstrates that Murphy, a Democrat, feared that American Indians would 
collectively vote for the Republican Party over the Democratic Party.  This could 
be a great concern to the Democratic Party, which had gained political control 
over the state since statehood.
83
  This statement reveals a lingering generalization 
of native peoples by whites, and the sentence furthermore exposes the reality that 
Native Americans were rarely thought of as independent individuals.  Most 
importantly, since Republicans were in control of the federal government, 
Arizona Democrats became alarmed that a new voting bloc would increase the 
political strength of the Republican Party in the state.  
At the end of the month, on July 25, 1924, Attorney General Murphy sent 
out letters of inquiry to the county attorneys of the fourteen Arizona counties 
requesting their views regarding the jurisdiction of the State of Arizona to 
establish polling places on Indian reservations.  For the most part, Murphy 
received more opinions from the county attorneys than he had asked for.  Despite 
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the fact that Murphy believed that, “Certainly, since citizenship is given to the 
Indian…he is entitled to vote,” various county attorneys disagreed.84  
J. Andrew West the Deputy County attorney for the Yavapai County 
responded first to Murphy‟s letter on July 30, 1924.  Before presenting any 
opinion on the jurisdiction of polling centers on reservations, West first tackled 
the issue of American Indian voting rights; “Citizenship is not coextensive with 
suffrage, as has been repeatedly held, and therefore the mere fact that the 
government makes an Indian a citizen does not in itself mean that the Indian can 
vote.”85  To support his statement, West cited a number of legal cases in which 
voting for state or county elections was withheld for military personnel residing 
on a base.  However, West overlooked the fact that these individuals had the right 
to an absentee ballot from their home state.  To make another point, West cited 
the outdated 1875 U. S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Minor v. 
Happersett.  He reminded Attorney General Murphy that in this U.S. Supreme 
Court judgment, citizenship for women did not include the eligibility to vote, and 
furthermore it took the Nineteenth Amendment to grant women suffrage in 
1920.
86
  In the rest of his letter, West specified legal reasons why the State of 
Arizona did not have jurisdiction to establish polling places on reservations.  He 
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further articulated the importance of the American Indian leaving his reservation 
in order to gain the rights of American citizenship, “I do not believe the Indian 
has acquired any right to vote unless he abandons the Indian reservation and 
establishes residence on property of this state.”87  West‟s rhetoric recaptures the 
lingering belief of late nineteenth century assimilationist Indian policy, of which 
Native Americans needed to abandon the tribalism of the reservation in order to 
become “civilized” through the tenets of Americanism.  
George W. Crosby Jr. responded on behalf of Coconino County Attorney 
Frank Harrison on July 31, 1924.
88
  Crosby was a Superior Court judge for 
Coconino County between 1915 and 1918, and mentioned in his letter to Attorney 
General Murphy that this topic had come up before during his term as judge for 
the Coconino County Superior Court.  Crosby stated several arguments in favor of 
establishing polling places on reservations and concluded that residency on a 
reservation did not disqualify a potential registrant.  Crosby finished his letter to 
Attorney General Murphy with the following assertion:  
The 30,000 newly made Indian citizens who live in the northern part of the 
three counties of Apache, Navajo, and Coconino, living off by themselves 
and with no training for citizenship may make an element that will bring 
on race troubles akin, in a small degree, to what the South went through 
since the enfranchisement of the Negroes.  I fear that we have not yet 
awakened to what troubles may come and will come, because and [sic] 
ignorant body of voters is a purchasable body to a greater or less extent, 
yet just as a matter of law I believe those Indians are not deprived of the 
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right of suffrage by living on the Indian reservations of Arizona.  If we 
stop them from voting, and I hope we can do so until they are better 
qualified, we must do it, in my opinion, in some other way than by holding 
them nonresidents because they live where they do.
89
  
Crosby truly shows his personal conflictions on the subject, fearing that American 
Indians were not educated enough to take on their new “civilized” responsibility, 
and acknowledging that there is little the state government can do to stop their 
enfranchisement, yet encouraging any attempt at a legal blockage from Murphy.  
A sense of white racial dominance and superiority stands out in this last paragraph 
of Crosby‟s.  He was a man of his times, who believed social and political 
problems would arise from the enfranchisement of a culturally different American 
populace.  This paragraph suggests the threshold of a power struggle between the 
dominant white governing class and the faction of new Native American citizens, 
whose fluctuating legal status was gaining more authority.  
Three other county attorneys did not agree for one reason or another that 
the new Native American citizens had any right to enfranchisement.  Pinal County 
Attorney, E.F. Patterson, wrote in a terse letter that he agreed the State of Arizona 
had no jurisdiction over reservations to institute polling places, and that American 
Indians living on reservations without another residence were ineligible, in his 
opinion, to vote.  Patterson made an important point, “The State of Arizona has 
absolutely no jurisdictions over the Reservations, except to serve civil and 
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criminal processes.  How has the State any power to punish infractions of the 
election laws, be they ever so numerous?”90  The formation of dual-citizenship of 
American Indians by the Indian Citizenship Act created new ambiguities in law 
for governing officials.  Graham County Attorney, E.L. Spriggs was the first 
County Attorney, and perhaps the first Arizona governmental official to point out 
the perception of the guardianship-ward legal status of American Indians in 
Arizona and its relationship to citizenship.  He wrote, “I am convinced it is proper 
to establish voting precincts upon reservations but there is a question as to the 
legality of an Indian‟s vote by reason of them being wards of the United States 
Government, if their being wards can be classed as guardianship.”91  Just a day 
later, Thorwald Larson of Navajo County also brought up the guardianship clause 
in paragraph 2879 of the Civil Code, and reiterated it in his letter to Murphy, “But 
idiots, insane persons and persons non compos mentis or under guardianship, shall 
not qualified to register for any election.”92  Larson wholeheartedly thought that 
the guardianship clause omitted any American Indian from enfranchisement if he 
was determined to be a ward of the government.  Larson was also the first person 
to connect the guardianship-ward argument with paragraph 2879 of the Arizona 
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Civil Code, a legal association that would later have a tremendous impact in the 
1928 Porter v. Hall trial.  
Two of the seven county attorneys that responded to Murphy‟s solicitation 
were in favor of establishing voting precincts on reservations and supported 
American Indian suffrage in Arizona.  Ross H. Blakely of Mohave County agreed 
that American Indians should be entitled to vote through the 1924 Indian 
Citizenship Act and saw no obstacles in establishing polling centers on the 
reservations.
93
  County Attorney, Levi S. Udall of Apache County, wrote 
Attorney General Murphy his view that voting precincts should absolutely be 
established on reservations and claimed at least five already had in Apache 
County.  Udall saw no hindrance to the Native American‟s eligibility to voting 
privileges, since their residence on a reservation, in his judgment, served the 
residency requirement in paragraph 2879 of the Civil Code.
94
  Levi S. Udall later 
went on to serve as Arizona Supreme Court Justice between 1947 and 1960, the 
year he passed away.  In a special irony, Udall‟s liberal stance on American 
Indian civil rights would have more effect in 1948, when he along with Justices R. 
C. Stanford and Arthur T. LaPrade provided the majority opinion in the Harrison 
v. Laveen case that would overturn the ruling in the 1928 Porter v. Hall trial.  It 
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seems that Udall from the beginning to the end of his political career was 
sympathetic to American Indian civil rights.  
Earlier in July, the Office of the Indian Affairs had already taken action to 
implement and clarify the new laws established by the Indian Citizenship Act.  
Commissioner Charles H. Burke sent out a circular to all reservation 
superintendents advising them of the Indian Citizenship Act and its terms.  Burke 
made it clear in the circular that the act did not change the legal status of 
individual or tribal property rights as stated under the provision, “That the 
granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the 
right of any Indian to tribal or other property.”95  Burke also explained that the 
transmittal of citizenship upon American Indians did not change their wardship 
status with the federal government; “…citizenship is not inconsistent with 
wardship, this act does not of itself terminate the wardship of the Indians.”96  
Furthermore, Burke advised all reservation superintendents to inform their Native 
American constituents of their new American citizenship status.  In the circular, 
Commissioner Burke wrote his interpretation of the act authorizing the 
enfranchisement of the new faction of citizens.  He explained, “…they are now 
entitled to suffrage under the same conditions as other residents of the State…”97 
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However, he encouraged that the superintendents review state election laws and 
inform the Native Americans in their district on the proper procedures and 
requirements to vote.  Burke understood that the act did not articulate the 
relationship of American Indian citizenship and suffrage.  Therefore, the purpose 
of ordering the superintendents to review state election laws was because each 
state still had the authority to determine the requirements of its electorate.  He 
concluded his circular with the importance of communicating the state election 
laws to Native Americans, “…you should endeavor to advise your Indians so as to 
avoid embarrassment or disappointment.”98  Burke knew that in some states, the 
disenfranchisement of American Indians would continue despite their new legal 
standing, and this belief proved correct in Arizona.  The following presidential 
election year of 1928 would reopen the dispute between white governmental 
officials on the issue of American Indian suffrage in Arizona.  
On May 23, 1928, Hubert Work, the director of the Department of the 
Interior, sent Governor Hunt an informational letter regarding the Merriam report 
and encouraged him to request a free copy from the Institute of Government 
Research, which produced the study.  While there is no supporting evidence that 
Hunt requested a copy, he did receive an abridged summary of the report.  
Officially titled, The Problem of Indian Administration, the Meriam Report came 
to fruition through the Committee of One Hundred, a conference held in 1923 of 
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one hundred individuals with knowledge and experience in American Indian 
affairs.  The group was composed of a broad spectrum of interested parties from 
the government including the Board of Indian Commissioners to private 
institutions like the Indian Rights Association.
99
  The Committee of One Hundred 
suggested that the Department of the Interior oversee a comprehensive study on 
American Indian welfare in the United States, in view of the fact that the agency 
generally received scattered and infrequent information about American Indian 
affairs.  With the support of John D. Rockefeller Jr., the Institute of Government 
Research, a non-governmental agency, conducted the study over a period of seven 
months in 1926.
 
 
A survey staff of nine specialized experts headed by Lewis Meriam 
researched and wrote the report.  A graduate of Harvard University and 
statistician by trade, Meriam previously worked for the United States Census 
Bureau between 1905 and 1912 before he moved onto the Institute of Government 
Research in 1916.
100
  The research team divided into eight specialties: legal 
aspects; general economic conditions; conditions of Indian migrants to urban 
communities; health conditions; existing material relating to Indians; family life 
and activities of women; education and agriculture.
101
  The Institute of 
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Government Research hired Henry Roe Cloud of the Winnebago Tribe as Indian 
Adviser.  Cloud attended Yale for his associate bachelor‟s degree and master‟s in 
anthropology between 1910 and 1912.  He was the editor for the Indian Outlook 
journal published by the American Indian Institute and the founder and president 
of the American Indian Institute.
102
  The specialist in legal aspects, who probably 
wrote the opinions on American Indian citizenship, was Ray A. Brown, an 
Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin.  Brown received his 
Doctorate of Juridical Science from Harvard Law School in 1923.
103
  
The Johns Hopkins Press published the report after its completion on 
February 21, 1928.
104
  Officials at all levels of the government throughout the 
United States received copies of the report, and it was accepted as the official 
guide for governmental action for the next two decades.  Work‟s explanation for 
the report to Governor Hunt suggested it was to help garner more information to 
solve the incessant “Indian Problem.”  He wrote, “The Indian is both an economic 
and humane problem of tremendous appeal.  Supervision of these wards of the 
Government is more involved and widespread than that of any bureau in this 
Department.”105  The prevailing conclusion of the report was that Native 
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Americans were in an economic crisis: “An overwhelming majority of the Indians 
are poor, even extremely poor, and they are not adjusted to the economic and 
social system of the dominant white civilization.”106  The report furthermore 
concluded, “The economic basis of the primitive culture of the Indians has largely 
been destroyed by the encroachment of white civilization.”107  Despite this 
allegation, the authors of the report furthermore asserted that there was nothing 
else to do but continue with assimilation policies, because,  
The fact remains, however, that the hands of the clock cannot be turned 
backward.  These Indians are face to face with the predominating 
civilization of the whites.  This advancing tide of white civilization has as 
a rule largely destroyed the economic foundation upon which the Indian 
culture rested. This economic foundation cannot be restored as it was.  The 
Indians cannot be set apart away from contacts with the whites.  The glass 
case policy is impracticable.
108
 
 
The “glass case policy” was a declaration by white friends of the Indians who 
admired Native American cultural aspects and wished to preserve the “vanishing 
race” by separating tribes from white civilization.109  However, as the report 
predicted, the “glass case policy” would be virtually impossible, and the solution 
of report was a continued guardian-ward relationship between the federal 
government and American Indians.  
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Within the 847 page report, citizenship issues were mentioned a handful of 
times.  The report determined that the issuance of citizenship to all Native 
Americans through the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act did not alter their status as 
wards of the government.  Federal guardianship was necessary because white 
government officials and the authors of this report commonly believed that Native 
Americans needed support in land rights issues and property ownership.  The 
following paragraph from the Meriam Report outlines the connection between 
citizenship, the guardian-ward relationship, and policy concerning American 
Indian property:  
This decision that citizenship and continued guardianship are not 
incompatible is not only sound law, it is also sound economic and social 
policy.  In matters pertaining to the ownership and control of property 
many Indians are in fact children despite their age, and real friends of the 
Indians can best serve them by having guardianship continued until the 
Indians through training and experience reach a maturity of judgment 
which will permit them to control their own property with a reasonable 
chance of success.
110
  
 
This previous paragraph specifically discusses the relationship between continued 
guardianship of American Indians and property rights, but it also makes an 
important description of Native Americans as “children.”  This view of American 
Indians as “children” is declared at least three times in the Meriam Report—all 
relating to the handling of property, citizenship, and questions of competency.  
With respect to competency, the Meriam Report states, “Indian guardianship was 
assumed when the Indians as a race were unquestionably incompetent…His status 
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is that of a child below legal age, except that he can be declared competent 
whereas a child cannot be.”111 
The perception that Native Americans were “children” is a form of racial 
stigma.  Racial stigma as Glenn Loury defines it is evident in the previous 
paragraph of the Meriam Report.  The perception that “many Indians are in fact 
children despite their age…” suggests an element of racial superiority and 
dominance by whites over Native Americans.  Adults care for children due to 
their inexperience and immaturity in most life skills; therefore, a generalized 
comparison of children to all Native Americans is an unabashed arrogance of 
white racial superiority.  The racial stigma of American Indians as “children” 
coincides with the paternalistic guardian-ward concept where Native Americans 
as wards to the federal government were perceived to be incompetent and 
incapable to survive without the aid of their guardian.   
Glenn Loury expanded upon the notions of racial stigma in his 2005 
article, Racial Stigma and its Consequences.  The “consequences” Loury finds 
with racial stigmas are their perpetuation.
112
  Again speaking of the white 
perception of African Americans, he writes, “An important consequence of racial 
stigma is „vicious circles‟ of cumulative causation: self-sustaining processes in 
which the failure of blacks to make progress justifies for whites the very 
prejudicial attitudes that, when reflected in social and political action, ensure that 
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blacks will not advance.”113  The perpetuation of racial stigma as Loury theorizes 
has its merits again with the paternalistic verbiage in the 1928 Meriam Report.  
The idea that American Indians needed guardianship from the federal government 
implies the racial stigma of them as incapable or incompetent of handling their 
own affairs, as is the perception of our children.   
The “vicious circle” that the paternalistic attitude of the United States 
government over tribal communities had in fact further caused their perpetual 
wardship.  The belief that American Indians needed to acculturate, and turn away 
from the tribalism or communalism of their culture had in fact damaged tribal 
communities more than it helped them.  The Dawes Act is a case in point; the 
relatively quick process of stripping tribal communities of their lands and 
resources through allotment policy was not only deleterious to the communalistic 
nature of their cultures, but ample evidence argues it led to increased economic 
and social strife.  White government officials assumed that the cultural ideals of 
Americanism were superior to the tribalism of Native American communities.  
The clash of cultures and the arrogance of cultural superiority by the United 
States government resulted in the perpetuity of the racial stigma of Native 
Americans as “children” or wards.  
The Meriam Report states, “Citizenship is, as has been said, primarily an 
individual and political right.  It, however, does not carry with it necessarily the 
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right to vote.”114  An explanation that the franchise is subject to state electorate 
requirements follows this statement.  If the authors of the Meriam Report 
perceived Native Americans as “children,” with the uncertainty of 
enfranchisement, then essentially American Indians were distinguished as 
something along the lines of citizen children.  Native Americans had become 
citizens, but in some states they were disallowed the right to participate in their 
own government.  Like women before the Nineteenth Amendment, Native 
Americans had little to no voice in the society that conquered them.  Therefore, it 
is not surprising to find that states with large populations of Native Americans 
like Arizona in 1928 would seek avenues to suppress their political power. 
For four years, the enfranchisement of American Indians remained 
dormant in the Arizona political arena, until a new national general election 
arrived.  The topic again became a heated debate resulting in a historic court case 
that would ultimately determine the legal status and civil rights of Native 
Americans in Arizona for the next two decades.   
By May of 1928, questions again arose about the legitimacy of the Native 
American franchise.  That month, W. H. Linville, the County Recorder of 
Maricopa County wrote the County Attorney‟s Office requesting information as 
to whether reservation American Indians could or could not register and vote in 
the upcoming primary and general elections.  Deputy County Attorney, Charles 
A. Carson Jr., responded with the opinion of the Maricopa County Attorney‟s 
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Office.  Carson cited two reasons why American Indians should not have the 
entitlement of voting privileges.  The first reason was the contested residency 
requirement.  The Maricopa County Attorney‟s Office held that since the state did 
not have jurisdiction over reservations, then those persons living on reservations 
did not technically qualify under the residency provision in paragraph 2879 of the 
Civil Code.  The residency requirement stated that an individual was required to 
establish residency for at least one year in the state, and thirty days within the 
county and precinct of which he or she wished to register.
115
   
Secondly, the office also considered that the wardship of American 
Indians negated their entitlement to vote.  As wards, the Office determined that 
reservation Native Americans “… are not allowed to make contracts concerning 
their property.”  Therefore, they were, “under guardianship in the sense used in 
the statute fixing the qualification of electors…”116  Only those Native Americans 
who had left the reservation and established residency outside of the reservation 
were, according to the Maricopa County Attorney‟s Office, eligible by state law 
to register and vote in all elections.  Carson concluded, “This is our opinion, 
notwithstanding the recent act of Congress declaring that all Indians are citizens 
of the United States.  The State of Arizona has the right to fix the qualifications of 
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its electors.”117  Carson‟s conclusions on American Indian suffrage in 1928 were 
the opposite of Attorney General Murphy‟s just four years earlier.  Murphy and 
Carson would again be involved in determining the voting rights of Native 
Americans by the fall of 1928.  Still serving as Arizona Attorney General, John 
W. Murphy and Attorney Charles A. Carson Jr. went on to become a part of the 
defense team for Mattie M. Hall, the county recorder of Pinal County and 
defendant in the 1928 Porter v. Hall trial.  Charles A. Carson Jr. while serving as 
the Deputy County Attorney for Maricopa County in 1928 was also an attorney in 
the law firm, Dodd L. Greer, Cummingham and Carson.  His partner, Dodd L. 
Greer, a Democrat, solicited Governor George W. P. Hunt for information on the 
legality of enfranchising Native Americans in Arizona.   
By July, Governor Hunt, Dodd L. Greer, and Attorney General John W. 
Murphy, all belonging to the Democratic Party, were engaged in an excited 
conversation over the upcoming 1928 state and general election and plausibility 
that the new Native American voting bloc could swing a large number of votes for 
the opposing Republican Party.  Murphy presented this concern back in July of 
1924 when he wrote to his friend, Frank M. Gold, also a lawyer.  Murphy feared 
then that the Republican Party, which had had federal control over the nation 
since the election of Warren G. Harding as president in 1921, would influence the 
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inexperienced native electorate.
118
  The summer before the 1928 election, 
Governor Hunt was pushing Attorney General Murphy to provide an opinion on 
the matter, and one that would serve the Democratic candidates like him, over the 
Republicans.  On July 21, 1928, Attorney Dodd L. Greer received a telegram 
from Governor W.P. Hunt regarding the pending decision from Attorney General 
Murphy on the legality of reservation American Indian suffrage as it pertained to 
state law.  Hunt‟s telegram reads, “Superior Court decisions in Arizona have held 
reservation Indians not entitled to vote, but non-reservation Indians no longer in 
status of wards of government are entitled to vote stop…”119  Hunt concluded by 
implying that the illiteracy clause of paragraph 2879 of the Civil Code would 
keep many American Indians from registering.  
Greer responded immediately that same day to Governor Hunt.  Writing 
from St. Johns, Arizona in Apache County, Greer speculated that the Republican 
Party had another agenda for registering Native Americans in his county other 
than for a liberal stance on civil rights.  Greer wrote, “I have learned from 
authentic sources, that in order to assist John H. Udall, in case he is the republican 
candidate for Governor that an attempt will be made to register every person that 
                                                 
118
 John W. Murphy to Frank M. Gold, letter, July 9, 1924,  RG 4, Office of the Attorney General, 
Arizona State Archives, Phoenix, AZ.  
  
119
 George W. P. Hunt to Dodd L. Greer, telegram, July 21, 1928, RG 1, Office of the Governor, 
SG 8, Governor George W. P Hunt, Arizona State Archives, Phoenix, AZ.  
 
61 
will vote the republican ticket.”120Greer informed Governor Hunt of the 
consequences of registering such a potentially large voting bloc of American 
Indians, and interestingly enough Mexican Americans.  In an impassioned tone, 
Greer wrote, “This will include some fifteen hundred navajo indians, and 
approximately five hundred mexicans [sic].  Of the five hundred mexicans which 
they propose to register not over 25% are qualified electors, and I feel confident 
that there are not fifteen indians now living off the reservations who are qualified 
electors [sic].”121  Strategically, Greer needed to argue reasons to disqualify these 
two groups of constituents from registering, in order to keep them from voting, in 
his mind, the Republican ticket.  Greer declared, “I am thoroughly convinced that 
the reservation indians, are not qualified electors.  The fact that the State court has 
no jurisdiction over them, and could not prosecute them for a violation of the 
election laws, is of itsself [sic] sufficient regardless of the fact that they are wards 
of the Government (under guardianship) which disqualifies them under our 
statute.”122  Understanding the challenge of disenfranchising such a large citizenry 
in a Republican controlled county, Greer further stated,  
There is absolutely no use to challenge, because the Republicans are in 
absolute control of each precinct where the indians and mexicans [sic] will 
be registered, and my idea to convince the county recorder of their 
disqualification to register, and thereby keep them off the register, if can 
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be done, if not then to bring an action and ask the court to enter an order 
canceling the registeration [sic] of all persons shown to be disqualified.
123
  
 
After replying to Governor Hunt‟s telegram, Greer took action and without delay 
filed a complaint to the Apache County Recorder‟s Office as he said he would do 
in his letter.  However, the Arizona chapter of the Republican National 
Committee straight away reacted to Greer‟s challenge.  Seemingly aware of 
Greer‟s political strategizing Hiram S. Corbett of the Republican National 
Committee appealed to Attorney General Murphy for a reiteration of his 1924 
opinion on the subject.  Corbett asked Murphy, “It is my recollection that some 
few years ago you gave an opinion that the Indians living on Indian Reservations 
could register and vote in national and state elections.”124  Indeed Murphy had 
publically given that opinion in the Arizona Republic in 1924 just days after the 
passage of the Indian Citizenship Act.  Corbett ended his letter requesting Murphy 
to provide yet another opinion on the topic to the Republican National Committee 
and all county recorders.   
Even though Attorney General Murphy was out of the state in Seattle 
Washington, Governor Hunt strongly goaded Murphy to respond to his inquiry 
regarding American Indian enfranchisement.
125
  With an impending election and 
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the threat of the opposing political party gaining more votes, Hunt wasted no time 
on the matter.  Murphy, outwardly irritated by Governor Hunt‟s full-court-press 
on him while he was in Seattle, wrote back to his assistant, “Dont [sic] Bill know 
that whites and Indians on reservation same position [.]  Does he want to 
challenge right to vote of patients government hospital [.]  Matter such 
importance that challenge means court proceeding if they wont [sic] wait my 
return one week [.]  Make best guess [.]”  Murphy‟s point about hospital patients 
was a reference to the guardian-ward argument.  Clearly, Murphy‟s stance on 
American Indian voting rights had not changed since his 1924 opinion, but in just 
a few months, as Attorney General of the state, he would have to defend a county 
recorder who denied two Pima Indians the right to register as electorates.  
The issue was no longer about civil rights as it was intended with the 1924 
Indian Citizenship Act.  In 1928, the question of American Indian 
enfranchisement was all political.  Representatives from the Democratic Party felt 
it necessary to block the registration of any American Indians in apprehension that 
the populace would unanimously vote Republican.  In turn, the Republican Party 
wanted the opposite result, and openly argued for Native American suffrage for 
the same belief that the constituency would vote for their party.  There was not 
one recorded thought from the Arizona political leaders in 1928 that an individual 
American Indian might vote for one party or the other, because he or she was 
intelligent enough to choose candidates based on their own individual values 
rather than what their tribe may have encouraged.  
64 
It is unclear how Governor Hunt felt on the topic, but correspondence 
between him and select lawyers in the state suggest that his political agenda to 
become Governor of Arizona for a seventh term outweighed any sympathetic 
views he may have had for American Indian civil rights.  That September, 
needing further legal advice on the matter, Governor Hunt appealed to Samuel L. 
Pattee of the Curley & Pattee Law Firm of Tucson, Arizona.  Pattee 
“regret[tingly]” admitted that all American Indians were entitled voting privileges 
for a number of reasons.
126
  Pattee reasoned that their citizenship status and the 
anti-discriminatory measures of the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution 
guaranteed their suffrage as did the language in the recent July 1928 Supreme 
Court decision of Dennison v. State authorizing a Hopi Indian and World War I 
veteran to serve as juror.
127
  Pattee also believed that the guardian-ward argument 
did not hold much merit in the situation as well, writing, “[the statute] at that time 
…obviously referred to ordinary guardianship which, as applied to adults means 
those persons who are under guardianship in the sense of a court having 
jurisdiction having appointed a guardian of the person or property of such a 
citizen on account of incompetency or inability to manage his own affairs…”  
Pattee further asserted,  
[even though] the relation of the government to Indians is sometimes 
spoken as a guardianship, it is not in the strict sense, the relation of a 
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guardian and ward…such right of control does not in my judgment affect 
or modify or limit the particular grant of citizenship contained in the act of 
congress above mentioned.  That an Indian is a member of a tribe and to a 
greater or less extent under the supervision of an Indian agent, would not 
seem in the least to affect his right of suffrage.
128
  
 
Again, Pattee brought up the Arizona Supreme Court decision to allow Native 
Americans to serve as jurors, because as Pattee argued the plaintiff suing for juror 
rights was an American Indian citizen residing on a reservation, which seemed to 
him to nullify the guardianship-ward argument.   
Despite Pattee‟s acknowledgement of Native American suffrage in 
Arizona, he twice stated his “regrets” in coming to this conclusion.129  In his 
opinion, the only way to block American Indian voter registration was to enforce 
state election laws regarding electorate qualifications.  Pattee wrote, “Not 
knowing much about the extent of education among the Indians, I am unable to 
state what effect this will have, but presumably, at least among the older 
generation, no great percentage of them will be able to comply with our 
requirements.”130  He continued, “Again, to prevent an influx of unintelligent 
Indian votes, which would be cast without any knowledge of why they were 
voting the way they did, it might be well to adopt a systematic course of 
challenging Indians at the time of election, which course, if persisted in, would 
probably result in limiting the numbers seeking the vote.”  Pattee‟s attitude of 
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white racial superiority had finally shown its full colors by the end of the letter to 
Governor Hunt.  His response to Governor Hunt was an opinionated mix of 
political and racial tones.   
As a white man, Pattee, along with other political and legal officials in 
Arizona of the time felt, the threat of enfranchising such a large minority 
population in the state.  Pattee asked the Governor if he had read the recent article 
in the Literary Digest.  The article Pattee suggested discussed the impact of the 
new Native American voting bloc in certain states with large populations of 
American Indians—Arizona being one of them.  The article stated, “Arizona, 
New Mexico, Montana, and South Dakota are other States in which, with the 
balloting close, practically solid voting by Indians would be influential in 
determining the outcome.”131  The “outcome” the article referenced was of course 
the upcoming 1928 election in which Native Americans in most states would for 
the first time cast a ballot as part of the electorate.  Pattee ended his letter with a 
slamming affront on the political acumen of Native Americans, “I realize that this 
subject is one that might cause some concern in class of votes so lacking in 
intelligence as to vote unanimously for one party, without having the slightest 
idea of any reason for doing it, and presents a dangerous situation in any 
community, and this without any regard to which party they favor.”132  Yet, 
Pattee‟s letter came too late for Governor Hunt to take any action; the Superior 
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Court had already filed a writ of mandamus on September 18, 1928, ordering 
County Recorder Mattie M. Hall to register Pima Indians, Peter H. Porter, and 
Rudolph Johnson, on the Casa Grande precinct poll books.
133
   
On August 10, 1928, Peter H. Porter and Rudolph Johnson filed 
registration affidavits before a qualified Deputy County Recorder for registration 
within the Casa Grande precinct.  Porter and Johnson were Pima Indians residing 
on the Gila River Indian Reservation near Sacaton in Pinal County.  They had 
lived on the reservation their whole lives, and did not own any property outside of 
the reservation.  The 1928 election year was the first year in which the two had a 
real opportunity to cast their vote in state and general elections since the passage 
of the Indian Citizenship Act in 1924.  The two men, eager to take advantage of 
their new rights as American citizens trekked to the Pinal County Recorder‟s 
Office to register as Democrats before the primary election scheduled for 
September 11, 1928.  Mrs. Harbison, the Deputy County Recorder initially 
accepted their applications for registration, but County Recorder Mattie M. Hall 
rejected the applications once they came across her desk disallowing the entrance 
of Porter and Johnson‟s names into the poll books of the Casa Grande Precinct, 
and withholding the certification of their names from the great register of the 
state.
134
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Superior Court Judge Frank O. Smith filed a writ of mandamus on 
September 18, 1928 ordering County Recorder Hall to register Porter and Johnson 
as voters within Pinal County.  Furthermore, if Hall continued to refuse to register 
the two men, Judge Smith filed an alternative writ of mandamus commanding 
Hall to appear before the Arizona Supreme Court by 10:00 am on September 25, 
1928 to show cause for her denial to register the two men.
135
  County Recorder 
Hall stood her ground and continued to reject Porter and Hall‟s application for 
voter registration; therefore, the Arizona Supreme Court received the submission 
of case 2793 Porter et al v. Hall on October 29, 1928.  Having missed their 
opportunity to vote in the primary election as Democrats, the clerk of the Supreme 
Court pushed Porter and Johnson‟s trial forward, in case a positive outcome 
would enable Porter and Johnson the right to vote in the upcoming general 
election on November 6, 1928.
136
  It was the first trial in Arizona to test whether 
Native American citizenship rights from the federal 1924 Indian Citizenship Act 
guaranteed enfranchisement according to Arizona state law.
137
 
Only a small number of prominent government officials supported Porter 
and Johnson‟s cause.  Superior Court Judge Frank O. Smith who ordered the writ 
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of mandamus also later served as council from the Indian Rights Association for 
the plaintiffs in the Arizona Supreme Court trial, Porter v. Hall.  The Indian 
Rights Association was a prominent national reform organization founded in 1882 
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  According to the association‟s constitution, “The 
object of the Association shall be to secure to the Indians of the United States the 
political and civil rights already guaranteed to them by treaty and statutes of the 
United States.”138  Unquestionably, through his involvement in ordering the writs 
of mandamus and in the subsequent Supreme Court trial, Judge Smith was 
actively following the tenets of the Indian Rights Association, of which he was a 
member and believed Native American citizens of Arizona had the right to vote.  
The influence of the association was evident through Judge Smith‟s participation 
in the Porter v. Hall trial.  
 Superintendent B. P. Six of the Bureau of Indian Affairs intervened on 
behalf of Porter and Hall.  Superintendent Six provided orders from the 
government to the Superior Court affirming that all Native Americans had voting 
privileges through the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act.
139
  Six‟s involvement is not 
surprising considering the active role Commissioner Burke played in 1924, when 
he advocated for Native American suffrage in Arizona according to the act.  Four 
years later, the issue became yet another battle for state rights between the federal 
government and the State of Arizona.  Although, once the case went to the 
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Arizona Supreme Court, the Bureau of Indian Affairs had no further power to stop 
an unfavorable ruling.  
The plaintiff and defense teams of the Porter v. Hall trial had a number of 
prominent legal minds of Arizona at the time.  John B. Wright the U.S. District 
Attorney for the District of Arizona, Edward Smith the Special Assistant to the 
U.S. Attorney, and the law firm Kibbey, Bennett, Gust, Smith and Lyman 
composed the legal counsel for plaintiffs Porter and Johnson with the guidance of 
Superior Court Judge Frank O. Smith, member of the Indian Rights Association.  
Arizona Attorney General John W. Murphy headed the defense team for County 
Recorder Mattie M. Hall along with Frank J. Duffy, the Assistant Attorney 
General, and Charles Carson Jr. the Deputy County Attorney of Maricopa County 
and member of the Green, Cunningham and Carson law firm.  Ernest W. 
McFarland the future Arizona Supreme Court Justice, U.S. Senator, and Arizona 
Governor also represented County Recorder Hall as the Pinal County Attorney.  
After its submission on October 29, 1928, case 2793 Porter v. Hall was 
decided five days later on November 2, 1928 and just days before the general 
election day of November 6, 1928.  Unfortunately, Porter and Johnson would 
never make it to the polling centers on Election Day, because the Arizona 
Supreme Court ruled against them denying their right to suffrage.  The Casa 
Grande Dispatch reported the court‟s decision on November 8, 1928:  “The 
decision effected over a hundred votes in this precinct of Indians on the Pima 
71 
reservation and thousands of Indians in the state who had hoped to cast their first 
presidential ballot [sic].”140 
The Supreme Court justices heard several arguments from both sides, but 
in the end, it was the dispute over what federal guardianship over American 
Indians truly meant according to state law and its applicability to voting rights 
that determined the outcome of the case.  In their memorandum brief, the 
plaintiff‟s team presented the requirements of the state electorate in paragraph 
2879 of the state Civil Code (Section II Article VII of the Arizona State 
Constitution): 
The Constitution of the State of Arizona and the statutes of the State of 
Arizona, Section 2, Article VII, Constitution, paragraph 2879, Civil Code, 
R.S.A., 1913, provides that all citizens of the State for one year next 
preceding the election and of the County and Precinct for thirty days, and 
who are able to read the Constitution of the United States in the English 
language in such a manner as to show that they are not reciting from 
memory, and who are not idiots, insane persons or non compos mentis or 
under guardianship or convicted of treason or of felony and not restored to 
civil rights, shall be deemed electors of the State of Arizona and entitled to 
register for the purpose of voting at all elections.
141
  
The two prominent arguments in the case, which the prosecution and defense 
disputed, were over residency requirement and guardianship.  The residency 
argument asked whether reservation American Indians qualified as electors under 
the residency requirements of the Civil Code.  The second debate was over the 
meaning of the words “under guardianship” in the Civil Code and whether 
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American Indians were “under guardianship” according to the interpretation of 
the statute.  
 The plaintiff‟s team used the recent decision in the 1928 Denison v. State 
trial to make the case that reservation American Indians in Arizona qualified for 
the electorate.  The Denison v. State burglary trial challenged “full-blooded” Hopi 
Indian W.H. Dolton as a qualified juror.
142
  In the case, the Supreme Court 
justices ruled that Dolton was eligible as a juror according to paragraph 3516, of 
the Civil Code, which read,  
Every juror, grand and petit, shall be a male citizen of the United States, a 
resident of the county for at least six months next prior to his being 
summoned as a juror, sober and intelligent, of sound mind, and good 
moral character, over twenty-one years of age and shall understand the 
English language.  He must not have been convicted of any felony or be 
under indictment or other legal accusation of larceny or of any felony.
143
 
Therefore, since the Arizona Supreme Court determined that Dolton, a male Hopi 
Indian, met the residency requirements to be a juror, and because he lived his 
entire life on an Arizona reservation, then it was assumed that Porter and Johnson 
also qualified as electors under the residency requirement, because they were 
Pima Indians who had also lived their whole lives on the Gila River Indian 
Reservation within the boundaries of the State of Arizona.
144
  The Supreme Court 
agreed with the plaintiff‟s argument for residency based on several other law 
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cases and ruled that the, “Plaintiffs, therefore, under the stipulation of facts, are 
residents of the state of Arizona, within the meaning of section 2, article 7, 
supra.”145 
 Juror Dolton, described as a “full-blooded” Hopi Indian incites some 
interesting social questions about the Porter v. Hall trial.  Professor of Politics 
and Government, Lauren L. Basson of the Ben-Gurion University in Israel asserts 
in her book, White Enough to Be American? Race Mixing, Indigenous People, 
and the Boundaries of State and Nation, that biracial individuals throughout 
American history have challenged the inconsistencies of monoracially constructed 
sociopolitical boundaries and customary racial categories.  Part-indigenous people 
have especially exposed the reality of the white dominating class using a 
combination of universalistic and ascriptive principles to achieve cultural 
hegemony in United States society.  Universalistic principles, Basson explains, 
are “inclusive” measures designed for the mutual equality of all citizens, whereas 
ascriptive principles assign rights and responsibilities to people based on 
distinguishing characteristics such as race, gender, religion, and ethnicity.  Basson 
argues that it was race that was the leading ascriptive principle used to describe 
national membership requirements.
146
   
                                                 
145
 Porter et al. v. Hall 2793, 6.  
 
146
 Lauren L. Basson, White Enough to Be American? Race Mixing, Indigenous People, and the 
Boundaries of State and Nation (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008),  
2.  
 
74 
Secondly, mixed-blooded American Indians challenged citizen eligibility 
requirements, because their mixed heritage did not fit into previously prescribed 
monoracially constructed sociopolitical boundaries.
147
  Third, mixed-race Native 
Americans tested previously understood social codes that paired “whiteness” with 
being “civilized.”148  Based on Basson‟s thesis statement, the question begs if the 
juror Dolton had been part white, would his eligibility as a juror ever have been 
questioned?  If Porter and Johnson were mixed-blooded American Indians, would 
County Recorder Hall have allowed them to register to vote?  
 The debate over the phrase “under guardianship” in paragraph 2879 of the 
Civil Code determining the requirements of the electorate was much more heated 
and complicated.  In order to win the case, the plaintiff‟s team effectively had to 
challenge the wardship status of Porter and Johnson by arguing that the two men 
had the individual legal status of sui juris—meaning essentially an individual‟s 
full legal competency.  In their memorandum brief, the plaintiff‟s team wrote, 
“The question was asked during the oral argument whether a white man in the 
same status as an Indian would be considered sui juris.  We have no hesitancy in 
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answering such a question in the affirmative…”149 Did a Native American have 
the same legal status as a white man?  Ultimately, this question would take over 
the case and determine its outcome.  
 The plaintiff‟s team gave several examples to support the point that the 
plaintiffs, Porter and Johnson, had the legal status of sui juris.  The plaintiffs, they 
asserted were not minors, they had the right to exit and enter the reservation at 
any time, make contracts of employment, purchase, or sale, and owned property 
that the United States government did not control.  Concerning any supervision of 
tribal property or livestock, they further insisted, “the function of the United 
States Government is limited to that of trustee.”150  In addition, while still 
members of the Pima Indian Tribe; both Porter and Johnson were not subject to 
the jurisdiction of the tribe.
151
  Therefore, the plaintiff‟s team argued, Porter and 
Johnson were “in every sense of the word… sui juris.”152 
 The plaintiff‟s legal team further maintained that the phrase “under 
guardianship” in paragraph 2879 of the Civil Code did not ever intend to 
reference American Indians.  The plaintiff‟s legal counsel contended that when 
state legislators wrote the statute in 1913, they did not have any consideration that 
Native Americans in Arizona would eleven years later in 1924 become citizens of 
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the United States; therefore, the phrase “under guardianship” did not apply to 
American Indians.
153
  
 In opposition, the defense team contended that Porter and Johnson did not 
maintain the legal status of sui juris and were therefore wards of the state.  In their 
opinion, the members of the Pima Indian Tribe and any residents of the Gila River 
Indian Reservation were “under the jurisdiction of the United States government 
and the regulations thereof,” because “the government of the United States 
exercises complete and detailed jurisdiction, supervision, and control over the 
persons, property, and commerce of the said Pima Indian Tribe.”154 
In the end, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff‟s writ of 
mandamus ordering County Recorder Hall to register them as electors.  Justice 
Alfred C. Lockwood gave the court‟s opinion, and Justice J. McAlister concurred.  
The majority interpreted the phrase “under guardianship” as someone the opposite 
of having the legal status of sui juris.  According to the majority opinion, a person 
under guardianship and persons described as insane or having non compos mentis 
had the common denominator of an inability to manage their own affairs and 
required assistance from the state to do so—in contrary to a person with sui juris 
who was competent enough to handle their own affairs without government 
assistance.  Therefore, the court concluded, “It is apparent to us that it was the 
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purpose of our Constitution, by these three phrases, to disfranchise all persons not 
sui juris, no matter what the cause, and its justice is plain.”155  
After establishing that the phrase “under guardianship” disallowed anyone 
identified as a ward of the government the franchise, the court had to connect this 
status to Native Americans.  The court held that all American Indians were in fact 
wards of the state and cited numerous court cases to support their ruling.  The first 
case they cited was unsurprisingly Cherokee v. Georgia, the near century old 
1831 United States Supreme Court landmark trial in which Chief Justice John 
Marshall opined that the relationship of Native Americans to the federal 
government “resembles that of a ward of his guardian.”156  Based upon this 
citation and several others, Justice Lockwood determined that “guardianship was 
founded on the idea that the Indians were not capable of handling their own 
affairs in competition with the whites, if left free to do so.”157  Justice Lockwood 
also cited the 1884 U.S. Supreme Court trial Elk v. Wilkins: “The Indians 
themselves cannot suspend that relation without the consent of the government, 
and it is for Congress alone to say when and how such relationship shall be 
terminated.”158  Even though only Congress had the power to end federal 
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guardianship over Native Americans, Justice Lockwood reasoned that the 1924 
Indian Citizenship Act did not sufficiently terminate the relationship.
159
  
Next, the court had to decide whether the plaintiffs categorized as persons 
under guardianship according to their interpretation of Arizona state law.  
Ultimately, it was the first residency argument that would hurt the plaintiff‟s case.  
Justice Lockwood determined that since Porter and Johnson had lived their entire 
lives on a federal Indian reservation that they were subject to the jurisdiction of 
the federal government and all its laws.  Furthermore, as residents of the Gila 
River Indian Reservation, Porter and Johnson were also liable to the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Indian Offenses—a federal court.  Therefore, based on these 
conclusions, Justice Lockwood contended that the plaintiffs were wards of the 
United States government.
160
  
The concluding paragraph of Justice Lockwood‟s opinion flatly refuses 
Porter and Johnson the right to vote, because of their wardship status with the 
federal government.  Justice Lockwood wrote,  
Whenever that government shall determine in regard to any Indian or class 
of Indians that they are so released, and that their status in regard to the 
responsibilities of citizenship is the same as that of any other citizen, the 
law of this state considers them no longer "persons under guardianship" 
within the meaning of section 2, article 7, of our Constitution, and they 
will be entitled to vote on the same terms as all other citizens.  But so long 
as the federal government insists that, notwithstanding their citizenship, 
their responsibility under our law differs from that of the ordinary citizen, 
and that they are, or may be, regulated by that government, by virtue of its 
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guardianship, in any manner different from that which may be used in the 
regulation of white citizens, they are, within the meaning of our 
constitutional provision, "persons under guardianship," and not entitled to 
vote.
161
 
 
Justice Lockwood‟s concluding statement rejected any obligation of the State of 
Arizona to reward voting privileges to American Indians based on their legal 
wardship status with the federal government.  Lockwood notes that the federal 
government‟s special “regulation” of American Indians “differs from that of the 
ordinary citizen.”  Therefore, in his opinion, the State of Arizona had no reason to 
award suffrage to a class of citizens who were considered outside of the norm, 
according to his views.  Lockwood‟s locution of legal opinion links to Edward 
Said‟s theoretical concept of the “Other,” which describes those individuals or 
group of individuals that are on the fringe of society.  Furthermore, Lockwood 
addresses perceived racial divisions, by equating an “ordinary citizen” with 
“white citizens.”  
Chief Justice Henry D. Ross gave the dissenting opinion that Porter and 
Johnson were guaranteed the franchise because of the “general and all-inclusive” 
wording of the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act, which awarded the plaintiffs United 
States citizenship.
162
  Furthermore, Ross addressed the use of the word 
“resembles” in the expression coined by Chief Justice Marshall in the 1831 
Cherokee v. Georgia U.S. Supreme Court trial.  He wrote, “The status of 
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guardianship disqualifying one to vote, in my opinion, is one arising under the 
laws providing for the establishment of that status after a hearing in court.  It is 
not a status that „resembles‟ guardianship, but legal guardianship, authorized by 
law.”163  Therefore, he reasoned that the phrase “under guardianship” in the 
Arizona Constitution did not pertain to Native Americans, because the statute 
specifically referenced a legal status determined by a state court.  He concluded 
his statement reasoning that perhaps Native Americans “should not, as a matter of 
public policy, be granted the franchise” because of their legal status with the 
federal government, but according to his interpretation of Arizona law, there was 
no reason in his mind to deny the vote to Native Americans.
164
  
 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Ross was the minority in the case, and the 
Arizona Supreme Court rejected Porter and Johnson‟s plea for suffrage.  The 
outcome of the trial drew local and national attention.  It made front-page 
headlines in the Phoenix edition of the Arizona Gazette with the subheading: 
“Ruling Hits Thousands in State: Judge Holds Redmen Are Wards of the 
State.”165  The article concluded with the following statement: “The decision 
affects the voting status of several thousand reservation Indians in Arizona, so 
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long as they remain in the guardianship of the government.”166  The New York 
Times also reported on the trial‟s conclusion in its November 4, 1928 article, 
“Arizona Court Holds Indians On Reservations Cannot Vote.”167  The short article 
began with the declaration that the court‟s decision affected “the voting status of 
several thousand Indians living on reservations in Arizona” despite the 
“Congressional act of June 2, 1924, which declared them citizens of the United 
States.”168  
Evidence suggests that a layer to the story surrounding the Porter v. Hall 
trial was purely political—members of the Democratic Party attempted to refuse 
any American Indian the right to register to vote in fear that the newly voting 
constituency would unanimously vote for the opposing party.  In contrast, 
members of the Republican Party challenged the denial of American Indian 
suffrage for the opposite reason.  Therefore, it is ironic that the two Pima Indians 
endeavored to register as Democrats in the 1928 primary election.  Perhaps in 
hindsight, Governor Hunt would have rethought his party‟s position on the matter 
if he had known he was to lose the 1928 gubernatorial election.  More voting 
Democrats like Porter and Johnson could have changed the outcome of the 
election in his favor.  After the Supreme Court ruling, the decision was 
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telegraphed to all the county attorneys and election board officials in the state in 
preparation for Election Day.
169
 
Despite the majority of white government officials involved in the 1928 
Porter v. Hall trial who supported the disenfranchisement of Native Americans 
either for political or racial reasoning, there were white government officials who 
did not.  Commissioner Burke, Superintendent Six, Superior Court Judge Frank 
O. Smith and a few county attorneys advocated on behalf of American Indian 
voting rights in this time period.  Their political stance on this manner suggests 
that the racial tensions surrounding the trial are complex.  While a majority of 
white government officials successfully suppressed the native vote, it does not 
mean that the dominant white ruling class was monolithically racist or uniformly 
had paternalistic feelings about white-Indian relations.  The representation of the 
minority white opinion on this matter demonstrates that the racial stigma of 
Native Americans was not always so black and white.  Indeed, the changing 
American society of 1930s and 1940s, and influential events like the Indian 
Reorganization Act, the Indian New Deal, and especially the impact of World 
War II produced a changing perception of American Indians within the United 
States and in Arizona.  Once American Indians were publically recognized in 
Arizona as American heroes for their service in the war, the necessity to change 
their voting status became more obvious.  
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CHAPTER 3 
"A MANIFESTATION OF DEMOCRACY." 
“…I am in question as to my citizen rights in this state…,” wrote Harvey 
E. West a self-described “half-blood” in a letter to Arizona Governor Sidney P. 
Osborn on November 16, 1947.
170
  During World War II, West spent five years as 
a volunteer with the Arizona National Guard and was discharged in 1945 as a 
First Lieutenant in the Transportation Corps of the 158
th
 Infantry of Arizona.  
Born in Kansas City, Missouri, West in 1947 was completing a master‟s degree in 
education at the Arizona State University in Flagstaff, Arizona.
171
  West was an 
American citizen of the highest potential as a veteran of the Arizona National 
Guard and a master‟s student.  His education and service to the state of Arizona 
should have certainly earned him respect.  Unquestionably, as an individual, 
West‟s background deflated the argument for federal guardianship, but, despite 
his stellar record, even West doubted his own legal status in Arizona.  Why did he 
feel the need to question his civil standing with Governor Osborn in 1947?  
Harvey E. West was an individual outside of the norm.  Who or what is 
considered normal or accepted is determined by mainstream society.  In America, 
the norm was to be non-Indian.  Being an American Indian, West was not sure 
where he stood as a citizen in Arizona.  The stigma of his Indianness forced him 
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to question his citizenship status with his Governor despite his background as an 
educated and respected member of the Arizona National Guard.   
Harvey West, was a citizen of the highest potential, yet he himself 
questioned the validity of his citizenship within Arizona.  West felt the need to 
write to his governor, because as a person of Native American descent in Arizona, 
he was ultimately questioning the state government‟s reasons for restricting the 
civil rights of Native Americans.  The restriction of civil rights towards citizens is 
reminiscent of Gyanendra Pandey‟s concept of the subaltern citizen.  Unable to 
vote in Arizona, West wanted to know the reasoning behind his “second-class” 
citizenship.  Little did West know when he was writing a letter to his governor on 
November 16, 1947, that eight days prior other Native Americans in Arizona had 
also forcefully attempted to test their own subaltern citizen status.  On November 
8, 1947, Frank Harrison and Harry Austin, Yavapai Indians from the Fort 
McDowell Indian Reservation, walked into the Maricopa County Recorder‟s 
Office in Phoenix to register to vote.  
Frank Harrison and Harry Austin attempted to register as Democrats for 
the upcoming primary and general election to be held the following year in 1948.  
The Maricopa County Recorder, Roger G. Laveen, refused to register Harrison 
and Austin, on the sole premise that the two men were reservation American 
Indians.  Laveen was simply following the state election law, which disallowed 
Native Americans as eligible voters.  According to the original Arizona State 
Constitution, American Indians residing on reservations were considered to be 
85 
ineligible to vote, by the reason that they were “under guardianship” of the federal 
government—an interpretation of the State Constitution that barred anyone 
“under guardianship” from voting.  Based on their wardship relationship with the 
federal government, the 1928 Porter v. Hall trial implemented this reading of the 
state election law, which resulted in the disenfranchisement of reservation 
American Indians in Arizona for the next twenty years. 
Before he enlisted with the United States military during World War II, 
Frank Harrison worked for the federal government on the construction of the 
Bartlett Dam on the Verde River.  Many American Indians in the area tried to get 
construction jobs at the dam site but were rejected for the positions.  Adamant that 
he was qualified for employment at the dam site, Harrison kept applying and 
persevered.  At last, Harrison and a number of other Native American men were 
admitted to unions and hired.  Harrison learned from the experience that 
“persistence led to success.”172  When Harrison returned to his reservation after 
the war, he observed his parents and other elderly members in his community 
enduring financial hardship.  Aware that the state government denied federal 
benefits guaranteed through the Social Security Act to his parents and others in 
his community, Harrison felt he could no longer tolerate the status quo.  He spoke 
with Harry Austin the Tribal Chairman and the two of them contacted United 
States Representative for Arizona, Richard F. Harless, along with Lemuel P. 
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Mathews and Ben P. Mathews, lawyers known on the reservation to work on 
behalf of other individual American Indians in legal cases.
173
 
Representative Harless with the assistance of attorneys, Lemuel and Ben 
Mathews filed a writ of mandamus ordering County Recorder Laveen to register 
Harrison and Austin within the Scottsdale precinct and on the general register of 
Maricopa County.  Following the established doctrine of the 1928 Porter v. Hall 
ruling, Judge Thomas J. Croaff of the Maricopa County Superior Court rejected 
their writ of mandamus and dismissed the case.  The plaintiffs, subsequently, 
appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court.  Chief Justice R.C. Stanford and Justice 
Arthur T. LaPrade heard the case along with recently appointed Justice Levi 
Stewart Udall who gave the unanimous opinion.  On July 15, 1948, the Arizona 
Supreme Court voted to reverse the decision of the lower court and consequently 
overturned the ruling in the 1928 Porter v. Hall trial.  The reversal, thus declared 
the eligibility of reservation Native Americans as electors if as individuals they 
also met the other electorate qualifications stated in the Arizona State 
Constitution.  Representative Harless proclaimed the court‟s decision, “a 
manifestation of democracy.”174  
 The fact that the Arizona Supreme Court of 1948 overturned a ruling it 
made in 1928 is a remarkable and infrequent instance.  By the time, Harrison and 
Austin walked into the Maricopa County Recorder‟s Office in 1947; American 
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Indian policy in the United States and in Arizona had already ebbed and flowed to 
a new course of further integration and recognition of tribal rights.  During the 
last two decades, while American Indians remained disenfranchised in the State of 
Arizona, two epic national events reverberated their influence onto the state level.  
The Great Depression of the 1930s challenged government officials on Capitol 
Hill to readdress the role of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and established 
American Indian policy.  In turn, World War II challenged the social fabric of 
American society.  Indeed, the events and actions surrounding the Great 
Depression and World War II influenced the Arizona Supreme Court in 1948 to 
reverse its decision in a Native American voting rights trial exactly twenty years 
earlier. 
With the inauguration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933, the 
United States underwent a series of liberal economic policies that became known 
as the New Deal.  The New Deal pumped millions of governmental dollars back 
into the economy through numerous innovative nation-building programs and 
projects.  The government support through the New Deal stimulated the economy 
and saved thousands of American citizens from further economic strife.  The 
1930s was an era ripe for change within the federal government.  When President 
Roosevelt appointed John Collier as commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
in 1933, he endeavored to radically change American Indian policy through his 
88 
new position.
175
  For the next twelve years, Collier directed the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs through one of the agency‟s most challenging times.  Arguably, Collier‟s 
greatest achievement was the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which he helped 
push through Congress.  
Many of the inadequacies and problems regarding the welfare of 
American Indians in the United States found in the 1928 Meriam Report were 
partially resolved through the Indian Reorganization Act, and many of the report‟s 
recommendation‟s utilized.176  The Wheeler-Howard Bill that became the Indian 
Reorganization Act was a forty-eight page document with four major sections.  
Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes strongly supported the act.  In a letter to 
Burton K. Wheeler, Chairman of the Committee of Indian Affairs of the U.S. 
Senate and Edgar Howard, Chairman of Committee of Indian Affairs of the 
House of Representatives, Ickes quickly summed up the purpose of the bill, 
The bill itself contains a clear statement of its purpose, which may be 
briefly summarized as the restoration to the Indians of fundamental human 
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rights, which have been impaired by a constantly increasing bureaucratic 
supervision over life and property.
177
  
 
In a speech, probably prepared for Congress, Felix S. Cohen, the assistant 
solicitor in the Solicitor‟s Office of the Department of the Interior wrote,  
This bill is the most progressive measure in all Indian legislation.  It helps 
the Indian to overcome the three fundamental obstacles to progress: First, 
the Indian‟s lack of education; second, his lack of economic opportunities; 
and third, his subjection to despotic bureaucracy.
178
  
The act was an experimental measure written by white government officials, like 
Collier.
179
  Congress and Collier‟s administration, however, did establish 
referendums on reservations across the country so that tribes could vote on the 
bill.  Most of tribal communities (181 tribes) voted in favor of the bill and 
seventy-seven rejected it, including the Navajos.
180
  The Navajos, the largest tribe, 
voted against the bill, because of Collier‟s livestock reduction program—that 
reduced their herds of sheep and hurt them economically.  Collier contended that 
his separate livestock program had nothing to do with the bill, but it was to no 
avail.
181
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Perhaps the most significant measure was the act‟s termination of the 
allotment system.
182
  Collier and his supporters recognized the devastating effects 
the allotment system had on tribal communities both economically and socially.  
An estimated 90 million acres of tribal lands were lost to white consumers and 
government appropriations.
183
  Instead, the act lengthened the trust status on 
currently existing properties for an indefinite period; returned surplus lands to 
their original tribal owners; allowed individual parcels to be returned to the tribe 
as communal property, and additionally, the act allocated two million dollars 
annually for the procurement of further tribal lands.
184
   
Another radical aspect of the Indian Reorganization Act was its policy for 
American Indian self-government.  The premise of this measure was to give tribal 
communities more authority by adopting their own governments.  This 
reorganization process, however, required “Federally approved” tribal 
constitutions and tribal councils.
185
  In the end, critics claimed the emulation of 
American democratic ideals imposed upon the traditional governmental values of 
individual tribes.  Critics of this aspect of the Indian Reorganization Act, many of 
them American Indians, felt that the United States government was once again 
                                                 
182
 Josephy, Jr., “Modern America and the Indian,” 202; Deloria, Jr. and Lytle, American Indians, 
American Justice, 14. 
 
183
 Josephy, Jr., “Modern America and the Indian,” 202. 
 
184
 Prucha, The Great Father, 962. 
 
185
 Josephy, Jr., “Modern America and the Indian,” 202; Iverson, "We Are Still Here,” 89-90. 
 
91 
coercing dominant white cultural values upon tribes.
186
  In turn, the act also began 
a slow process of decentralizing the Bureau of Indian Affairs, by redistributing 
more authority back onto tribal communities through their new governmental 
systems.
 187 
A third important component of the act was the establishment of a ten 
million dollar revolving credit fund for economic revitalization.
188
  The Act also 
provided a $250,000 stipend in support of American Indian vocational and trade 
education.
189
   
In a resolution to Commissioner Collier, the Apache of the White 
Mountain Apache Indian Reservation supported self-government, but for the tribe 
in 1934, tribal leaders felt that they were “not capable” of self-government for the 
time being.
190
  For the most part, the Apache tribe supported the bill.  In their 
resolution to Commissioner Collier, they wrote, 
We feel that this section of the Bill is a good thing in that it provides a 
more liberal policy of administration of our own affairs, and that if passed, 
we can look forward to a greater voice in the administration of our own 
affairs, and can, as soon as we feel we are capable of gradual 
administration of our own affairs adopt in part, or in whole a plan of local 
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self-government, which will place more of the responsibility of our local 
affairs on our own shoulders.
191
 
 
The Apache tribe wholeheartedly agreed with the act‟s provision on education 
financial assistance.  They also approved of the proposed Court of Indian Affairs.  
In Collier‟s original draft of the bill, which Congress drastically edited, he hoped 
to establish a Court of Indian Affairs separate from federal courts.  
Collier‟s plans for an “Indian New Deal” did not stop there.  He 
recognized that Native American communities were largely left out of New Deal 
assistance programs, and sought other measures to even the playing field.
192
  In 
April 1933, the first year he was in office, Collier managed to get Congressional 
approval for an Indian Civilian Conservation Corps to stimulate job creation for 
Native Americans on reservations.
193
  Those who enlisted with the Indian Civilian 
Conservation Corps generally made construction and maintenance enhancements 
to their reservation.
194
  Collier also succeeded in getting the Indian Arts and Crafts 
Act passed in 1935.  This act was an offshoot of the Public Works of Art Project 
under the Civil Works Administration.  The act employed Native American artists 
to create artwork for public places.
195
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Arizonans and especially Native Americans felt the devastating 
socioeconomic effects of the Great Depression.  Evidence suggests that non-
native unemployed workers received preferential treatment for jobs over 
American Indians in Arizona—a fact Commissioner Collier was well aware of 
and worked to eliminate through his Indian New Deal programs.  Forest M. 
Parker, Chairman of the Apache County Welfare Board wrote Governor 
Benjamin B. Moeur on July 10, 1933 regarding employment discrimination of 
Navajos in his county.  Parker contended that the government overlooked Navajos 
as potential workers for State Highway Projects, because of their legal status as 
non-voting wards of the state—a status based on the 1928 ruling in the Porter v. 
Hall Arizona Supreme Court trial.  Parker requesting Governor Moeur‟s 
assistance in the matter wrote,  
These indians [sic] are citizens of the United States and recognized as 
such.  Many are tax payers and all are subject to taxation if they have 
anything taxable…It does not seem just to me that these American 
Citizens should be denied the right to consideration on these projects just 
because the State Supreme Court has decided they are not entitled to a 
vote.
196
 
The wardship status of Navajos in Apache County directly contributed to their 
societal position as subaltern citizens.  They could not vote for representatives or 
policy that affected them and furthermore they were denied good jobs in a tough 
economy.  The ramifications of this allegation from Parker are alarming, because 
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the second-rate citizenship status that American Indian citizens endured not only 
affected their right to vote in elections, but it affected opportunities for 
employment.  It was economic discrimination at its worst, and the racial bias to 
hire unemployed white workers over American Indians during the Depression was 
according to Forrest M. Parker, directly connected to the special wardship status 
that the Arizona Supreme Court nurtured in the earlier Porter v. Hall trial.  It is 
unclear whether Governor Moeur acted upon Parker‟s request for assistance in the 
matter.  
Besides the Indian Reorganization Act and the Indian New Deal, John 
Collier worked on other issues of importance.  He supported measures that 
promoted the freedom of native religions—a principle he was passionate about, 
and he believed in the cultural plurality of American Indian tribes.
197  
The Indian 
Reorganization Act in many ways followed Collier‟s ideas about cultural 
pluralism.
198
  Many of the programs he organized during his tenure sponsored a 
“cultural renewal” within tribes, like the 1935 Indian Arts and Crafts Act.199  
Furthermore, Collier decreased federally imposed restrictions on reservations with 
the encouragement of more self-government by tribal communities.
200
  This last 
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action under Collier truly demonstrates his willingness to let go some of the 
responsibilities and control the United States government had over tribal 
communities, and his push towards native self-government.  Collier whether he 
intended to or not, eased the guardianship relationship between reservation 
American Indians and the federal government.  The Indian Reorganization Act 
and the Indian New Deal, thus, provided an emphasis on Native American 
competency.  Yet, the implementation of tribal self-governments was still an 
Americanized process and an assertion of power over native people. 
John Collier‟s Indian Reorganization Act drew support from unlikely 
sources.  In 1929, the Good Housekeeping magazine published a series of three 
articles on the plight of Native Americans across the nation.  Most of the articles 
discuss serious issues such as health, education, and poverty, and especially of 
American Indian children, which tugged at the heartstrings of thousands of the 
magazine‟s primarily women readers.  Emotionally titled articles like “The Cry of 
a Broken People: A Story of Injustice and Cruelty That is as Terrible as it is 
True,” and “We Still Get Robbed;” the third article “The End of the Road” focuses 
on the findings of the 1928 Meriam Report.
201
  The last article urges its readers to 
research more on the topic and read the Meriam Report, Senate hearings, and 
other suggested materials that would educate them on the conditions of Native 
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Americans and the “Indian Problem.”  This last article also included an interview 
with John Collier, then the Secretary of the American Indian Defense Association, 
and highly praised his efforts for the American Indian cause.  The article 
concluded by encouraging its readers to write to their Senators, Representatives, 
and President Hoover to improve the lives of American Indians.  The article 
promoted the organization of “Indian Welfare” groups headed and led by women.  
Lastly, the article sermonized,  
Ranged opposite you in the fight you will find all the most formidable 
forces of organized corruption…This power may at first appear 
invulnerable.  But it has its fear-spot.  It fears today, more than any other 
one thing, the righteous wrath of American womanhood—of home 
women, consecrated women, aroused to deep indignation and banded 
together in a crusade to obtain justice for the oppressed.
202
 
 
Women all over the United States read the article, and responded to it.  By 1934, 
Vera Connolly, author of the first three articles wrote her last and final article in 
support of the Indian Reorganization Act.  The 1934 article, “The End of a Long, 
Long Trail,” pleaded for women again to write to their senators and 
representatives to pass the Wheeler-Howard bill.
203
  Connolly reminded her 
readers the impact they had on American Indian affairs in the last five years: 
You listened.  Your hearts were wrung.  You—white women—arose in a 
body.  You demanded an overturning of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 
Washington.  You demanded a new day for the Indian people.  By the 
thousands, you wrote to your representatives in Congress and demanded 
that they act.  This great tidal wave of righteous anger—woman anger—
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performed a miracle.  It gave the needed onward rush to the slowly 
mounting sea of public dissatisfaction with the conduct of Indian 
affairs…this great tidal wave of woman indignation helped sweep the 
movement for reform of Indian affairs to victory.
204
  
 
Connolly‟s series of four articles over five years written for a base of 
predominately-white women readers suggests the power women had in 
influencing the progression of American Indian affairs.  Certainly, women did 
have authority by writing to their Congressmen and convincing their husbands, 
fathers, brothers, and male friends to react to the plight of the American Indians.  
The articles demonstrate an attitudinal change of white American thinking 
towards Native Americans.  American Indians became a group of people that 
needed the help and support of white people.  The slant of the articles to include 
statistics and stories of American Indian children, no doubt caused women 
reading the articles to respond in a humanitarian way.  Public awareness of the 
“Indian Problem,” through the printing of these articles in the Good Housekeeping 
magazine had the potential to reach millions of households across the United 
States, and these articles contributed to the passage of the Indian Reorganization 
Act.  
  Having drafted much of the Indian Reorganization Act himself, Felix S. 
Cohen saw the bill as a way to uplift Native American people from economic, 
social, and political despair.  In a speech he prepared for Congress, Cohen 
proclaimed,    
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The pending bill would give the Indians a start in the direction of self-
discipline and self-respect.  It would enable the Indians of a reservation to 
organize on a permanent basis, to train themselves in the tasks of local 
self-government, to consult with the Indian Office in all matters affecting 
their own welfare, and to exercise a final veto against any improper 
disposition of their own funds.  These are the first steps of political 
advancement.
205
 
 
Like Collier, Cohen believed that the major tenets of the Indian Reorganization 
Act would empower tribal communities to exercise their sovereign rights.  The 
passage of the act demonstrated a restructuring of a political power paradigm, in 
which the United States government bequeathed to individual tribes more control 
over their assets and their affairs.  The empowerment that the federal government 
theoretically bestowed to those willing tribes was limited in that tribal 
communities were essentially forced to model their new tribal governments after 
American standards.  In other words, the United States government gave tribes 
more sovereign power, but then turned around and told them how to operate it.  
Compelling the reproduction of the American democratic form into tribal 
governments was another form of assimilation and another attack on the 
communalism of tribalism.  In effect, it was limited federal control over American 
Indian communities clothed in the promise of increased independence.  The intent 
to further assimilate American Indian communities was transparent.  In the same 
speech quoted above, Cohen added,  
Nothing in all this program can have the effect of segregating the Indians 
or preventing their assimilation of the best traditions and achievements of 
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our own society.  Rather, this bill seeks to give the Indian for the first time 
a real chance to secure the greatest achievements of the white society 
around him, training in the skilled tasks of that society, a higher standard 
of living, and a voice in his own government.
206
  
There were other reasons for decentralizing the Bureau of Indian Affairs and 
empowering tribal communities through the Indian Reorganization Act.  A 1934 
article from the journal Current History reveals an economic element for 
enforcing the Indian Reorganization Act: “From our white point of view, it means 
taking a large number of dependent people and making them self-supporting, with 
an increased area of land devoted largely to non-competitive subsistence 
farming…  Incidentally, it means an immediate saving to taxpayers of a million or 
more dollars per annum in needless paternalistic outlay.”207  The federal 
government was well aware of the costliness of overseeing the welfare of 
thousands of people under its guardianship, especially during the difficulty of a 
depression.  
Besides his important role in helping to draft the Wheeler-Howard bill, 
perhaps Felix S. Cohen‟s greatest contribution to American Indian affairs is his 
1939 publication of The Handbook of Federal Indian Law, of which government 
officials at all levels used as a reference for American Indian policy-making.  
Born in 1907, Cohen received his master‟s degree in philosophy in 1927 and then 
his PhD in 1929 both from Harvard.  In 1931, Cohen graduated with an LLB 
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from Columbia Law School.  Between 1933 and 1947, Cohen advanced from 
assistant solicitor in the Solicitor‟s Office to chairman of the Department of the 
Interior‟s Board of Appeals.  During his tenure in the Department of the Interior, 
Cohen helped draft the bill for the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act.  In 1939, 
while editing The Handbook of Federal Indian Law, Cohen was consequently 
appointed the Chief of the Indian Law Survey.  When he retired from the 
Department of the Interior in 1948 to practice law, Cohen was honored with the 
Distinguished Service Award—the Department‟s highest tribute.  During his 
time again as a lawyer, Cohen became the General Counsel of the Association on 
American Indian Affairs.  As General Counsel, he became involved in the 
Arizona Supreme Court case Harrison v. Laveen, of which he co-wrote a brief of 
amicus curiae.  Cohen also gave his support to the 1948 New Mexico Supreme 
Court American Indian voting rights case, Trujillo v. Garvey, when he presented 
an oral argument on behalf of the plaintiffs in that case.  His contributions to both 
cases, helped achieve a successful outcome of the enfranchisement of Native 
Americans in those two states.
208
  
Felix Cohen understood that white Americans generally classified Native 
Americans as second-class citizens, primarily because of the tribalism of Native 
communities was counter to European western mainstream thinking, and, 
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secondly, the degrading  status  of their wardship with the federal government 
contributed to their categorization as second-rate citizens.  Cohen held passionate 
views about empowering American Indians and uplifting them to obtaining full 
equal citizenship status.  He spent many years of his life involved in American 
Indian civil rights issues.  In his article titled, “Indians are Citizens,” Cohen 
discusses the problems of suppressing the rights of the American Indian: 
If Indians are, by and large, as I think, an underprivileged minority group, 
a group against which many illegal or extralegal forms of oppression and 
discrimination are practiced, then the problem of protecting the legal 
rights of Indians is not purely an individual problem.  Rather, it is a 
problem which affects Indians as a group and therefore profoundly affects 
the rest of society, for while racial oppression has seldom destroyed the 
people that was oppressed, it has always in the end destroyed the 
oppressor.  The rights of each of us in democracy can be no stronger that 
the rights of weakest minority.
209
  
 
Cohen essentially described the Native American as a subaltern citizen—a 
second-class citizen who has restricted rights and little voice to speak out against 
the discriminations that beset him/her.  Native Americans through treaties, laws, 
and legislation have indeed had a “peculiar” dual citizenship status with the 
United States since the end of the nineteenth century, but that, Cohen states, 
should not affect their legal rights as citizens of the United States.  As a student of 
philosophy and law, Cohen grasped the connection between racial oppression and 
the failings of democracy.   
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A bright lining to the history of World War II was its impact on the home 
front with respect to minority and women‟s rights.  After the 1941 attack on Pearl 
Harbor forced the involvement of the United States in World War II, millions of 
Americans including members of all minority groups and women willingly 
mobilized for war.  The war provided a positive attitudinal change towards 
minorities and women, because everyone‟s contribution to the war effort was 
desperately needed and appreciated.  The image of the iconic “Rosie the Riveter” 
demonstrates the further move of women from the private sphere to the public 
sphere.
210
  With the onslaught of World War II, many Native Americans felt it 
was their “duty” to contribute to the war effort.211  Approximately 25,000 men 
and 700 women from numerous Native American tribes across the country either 
joined or were drafted into military service during the war.
212
  Of their ethnicity, 
Native Americans have the highest ratio to the total United States population for 
serving in the Armed Forces, and they have served in every American war.
213
  
Native Americans were exempted from the draft during World War I, because of 
their general non-citizenship status, but after their status changed with the passage 
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of the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act and the 1940 Nationality Act, most were 
drafted in World War II, despite high numbers of volunteers.
214
  
Admiration for Native American veterans swept across the country, 
especially with the publicity of Ira Hayes, the Pima Indian who helped raise the 
flag on Mount Surabachi in Iwo Jima.
215
  The Navajo code talkers project may 
have been a secret military operation during the war, but it was no secret to 
Arizonans that there were high numbers of volunteering Navajos entering the 
armed services.  An estimated 450 Navajos were trained as code-talkers during 
World War II.
216
  The popularity of the Navajo code talkers, especially within the 
United States military, also contributed to an increase of respect towards 
American Indian communities.
217
  For white Americans, the figures of Ira Hayes 
and the Navajo Code talkers challenged preconceived notions of Native 
Americans.
218
  In Arizona, the home of both Ira Hayes and most of the Navajo 
code talkers, appreciation for American Indians veterans increased exponentially.  
Governor of Arizona during World War II, Sidney P. Osborn, expressed his high 
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regards for Native American soldiers on more than one occasion.  He wrote in 
1946, “We are proud of the splendid showing made by the Indians of Arizona, 
both men and women, on all the far flung fields of the war.  They stood shoulder 
to shoulder with Americans of other races and did not flinch when the crucial tests 
of battle came.”219  Governor Osborn felt that further assimilation of Native 
Americans into American society was warranted based on their service to the war 
effort.  In fact, Governor Osborn seemed to infuse the heroism of Native 
American soldiers with Americanism: “Every once in a while, I receive a report in 
my office showing that our young Indian men are making splendid soldiers.  They 
have the right sort of American spirit.”220  The “American spirit” Governor 
Osborn refers to is a level of assimilation, the Native American veteran had 
achieved.  Indeed, many American Indian veterans after returning from war did 
leave their reservations for a more non-native life experience.  Many found the 
modernization of the non-reservation world more appealing.  In a sense, World 
War II contributed to the further assimilation of a large number of Native 
Americans, a goal Governor Osborn expressed: 
Our Indian soldiers of Arizona have made a fine record in this war, of 
which the state is quite proud.  I am a strong believer in the policy that the 
Indians of Arizona, which comprise such a large proportion of our 
population, should be given every opportunity and encouragement to 
amalgamate themselves with the rest of the population.  Such an 
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amalgamation, in my opinion, would be of great benefit both to the 
Indians and to the rest of our population.
221
 
 
Part of the amalgamation of Native Americans was having a voice in the 
American democratic society.  World War II directly contributed to an increase in 
awareness of the injustice of disenfranchising Native American veterans in 
Arizona.  Therefore, it was necessary for Native American civil rights activists to 
utilize the popularity of the American Indian veteran towards achieving voting 
rights for all American Indians in Arizona.  
  Despite the clear ruling of 1928 Porter v. Hall barring Native Americans 
residing on reservations the right to vote, the voting status of non-reservation 
American Indians was nebulous at times for the next two decades.  This issue 
became a notable problem when it was discovered that a significant number of 
discharged Native American veterans had left their reservations since the war.  
According to an article printed in 1945 by University of Arizona Political Science 
Professor N.D. Houghton, even American Indians who had left their reservation 
were ineligible for the electorate.  Houghton discovered that the Attorney 
General‟s Office made this judgment in 1944.  Quoting Attorney General Jon 
Conway on November 6, 1944, “We [the Attorney General‟s Office] do not think 
an Indian loses his status as a ward of the government when he moves off the 
Reservation and goes on his own.”222  Houghton further reported that only six of 
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the fourteen counties at the time allowed non-reservation American Indians the 
franchise.
223
  Less than two years later, on March 27, 1946, Secretary of State 
Daniel E. Garvey requested an opinion from Attorney General John L. Sullivan 
on the voting status of American Indians in Arizona.  Attorney General Sullivan 
reiterated the 1928 Porter v. Hall decision, but also stated that any American 
Indian determined to be “emancipated” from guardianship could vote, based on an 
individual assessment.
224
  Evidently, the Arizona government was not consistent 
with regard to the voting status of those Native Americans who had left the 
tribalism of the reservation, and abandoned their wardship with the United States.  
In just two years and from two different Attorney Generals, the edict on the 
matter was quite different.  
In response to governmental actions like the Indian New Deal, 
approximately eighty Native American intellectuals and government officials 
founded the National Congress of American Indians in Denver, Colorado, in 
November 1944.
225
  The group was composed of representatives from fifty tribes.  
The association‟s objectives emphasized American Indian civil rights issues and 
full citizenship.  Native American voting rights was specific key issue the 
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organization endorsed.
226
  By 1947 and 1948, the postwar period provided an 
opportunity for the National Congress of American Indians to take action in 
Arizona and New Mexico in support of Native American suffrage.
227
  The 
increased integration of Native Americans into the larger American society during 
World War II, and their involvement in the war effort provided an opportunity for 
the National Congress of American Indians to test the current voting laws in 
Arizona and New Mexico, the last two states to deny American Indians the 
franchise.  
The National Congress of American Indians was involved in two Arizona 
court cases challenging the state‟s current election laws that disenfranchised 
Native Americans.  Harrison and Austin‟s lawsuit was not the only civil action 
filed against county recorders in Arizona by Native Americans for the pursuit of 
enfranchisement, but it was the only one to go through state courts.  In a second 
strategy, the National Congress of American Indians arranged for a civil action 
against Arizona officials in the federal United States District Court.
228
  On March 
4, 1948, a Mohave and three Apache Indians filed a joint civil suit against the 
county recorders of the Navajo and Gila counties for violating the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by disallowing the 
plaintiffs‟ registration on the counties‟ general register, because the plaintiffs 
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were Native American.  Louis Kichiyan and Marvin Mull from the San Carlos 
Reservation with Lester Oliver and Robert J. Suttle of the Fort Apache 
Reservation sued their respective County Recorders, Joseph Kinsman of Gila 
County and Elda Probst of Navajo County.  Felix S. Cohen and James E. Curry of 
the National Congress of American Indians headed a team of four local lawyers to 
represent the plaintiffs.  The complaint‟s main allegation was a challenge to the 
1928 interpretation of the Arizona State Constitution that disqualified reservation 
American Indians from the electorate based on their legal status as wards of the 
federal government.  Attorney Guy Axline, attorney for the plaintiffs stated to the 
Arizona Daily Sun, “This action will give the Federal courts a chance to rule on 
the rights of Indians to vote.”229  In the end, the federal courts would not decide 
the fate of disenfranchised Native Americans in Arizona.  The case apparently 
never resulted in any further judicial ruling, because the Harrison v. Laveen trial 
was already on the docket for the Arizona Supreme Court.  The addition of this 
identical civil suit in Arizona at the same time of the Harrison v. Laveen trial 
represents a concerted effort by the National Congress of American Indians and 
willing Native Americans to force change in the state.
230
  
In the end, only the Harrison v. Laveen trial caused a dramatic shift in 
judicial precedent in favor of Native American enfranchisement.  Both the 
                                                 
229
 “Indian Ballot Suit Filed: Navajo, Gila Recorders to be Defendants, Apaches Serve Complaint 
Today,” The Arizona Daily Star, March 17, 1948.  
 
230
 Riggs, “Dual Citizenship,” 11.  
 
109 
plaintiff and the defense teams for the Supreme Court case presented strong 
evidence, but in the end, the plaintiff‟s arguments swayed the Arizona Supreme 
Court Justice‟s opinions.  Just as in the Porter v. Hall trial twenty years earlier, 
the issue of federal guardianship over American Indians was at the forefront of 
the case.  The political ramifications the case‟s decision could have on American 
Indian civil rights drew attention from a number of interested parties.  
Understanding the racial undertones of the trial and its implications for full 
American Indian citizenship, Representative Harless wrote: 
I personally will not relent in my efforts to establish full citizenship and 
personal rights for the Indians while I am in public office.  I see no 
justification for denying suffrage to any qualified voter.  I see less 
justification for doing so because of the individuals racial background.  
Unfortunately, our attitude and treatment of the Indians has been allowed 
to become out-dated, and the Governments of the United States and of the 
various States must begin to face the facts now and to correct a situation 
which has grown out of indifference toward the progress and development 
of our Indian citizenship.
231
 
 
With the written support of the Department of the Interior, the Department of 
Justice filed a brief of amicus curiae on behalf of the appellants.
232
  In addition, 
the National Congress of American Indians and the American Civil Liberties 
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Union also filed a joint brief of amicus curiae in support of Harrison and Austin‟s 
cause.
233
   
The plaintiff‟s detailed and intelligent effort in finding holes in Justice 
Lockwood‟s opinion from 1928 truly won them the case.  In addition, the briefs of 
amicus curiae from the Department of Justice, the National Congress of American 
Indians, and the American Civil Liberties Union strengthened their argument.  
County Attorney Francis J. Donofrio and Deputy County Attorney Warren L. 
McCarthy of the defense team, arguably presented a thorough legal defense for 
continued Native American disenfranchisement in Arizona, but their reasoning 
was largely outdated and mostly taken from the original Porter v. Hall trial.  
The plaintiffs first presented the basic facts of the case.  The appellants, 
Harrison and Austin, members of the Mohave-Apache Indian Tribe alleged that 
they met all the qualifications to vote.  They were United States citizens, long-
time residents of Maricopa County and the Scottsdale precinct, were at least 21 
years of age, could read the State Constitution without memorization, were not 
idiots, insane or non compos mentis, and never convicted of a felony.  
Furthermore, they lived on the Fort McDowell Indian Reservation, which was 
entirely within Maricopa County and Scottsdale precinct.  They also owned off-
reservation property, on which they paid taxes.  Lastly, they could move on and 
off the reservation at will and were subject to state and federal civil, and criminal 
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laws.  The single definitive point of disqualification they acceded was their 
alleged status as federal wards, which the appellants wholeheartedly 
denounced.
234
  
A number of influences directly and indirectly affected the outcome of the 
Harrison v. Laveen trial.  On December 5, 1946, President Harry S Truman issued 
Executive Order 9808 establishing a committee on civil rights.  After a review of 
governmental policies and law, and listening to governmental agencies through 
special hearings, the Committee on Civil Rights produced a comprehensive report 
containing proposed measures to mitigate acknowledged inadequacies of civil 
rights issues for all United States citizens.
235
  The Committee presented the report 
to President Truman in December 1947, just days after Frank Harrison and Harry 
Austin tried to register to vote in Maricopa County, and months before the 
Arizona Supreme Court justices would review their appeal.  The fifth proposal of 
the Committee‟s recommendations in Section III “to strengthen the right to 
citizenship and its privileges” was “the granting of suffrage by the States of New 
Mexico and Arizona to their Indian citizens.”236  The Committee urged for a 
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“reinterpretation” of the current State Constitution because the exclusionary 
phrase “persons under guardianship” the Committee affirmed, “might hold that 
this clause no longer applies to Indians.”237  The Committee also acknowledged 
that the return of disenfranchised American Indian veterans from the war had 
sparked protests for change.
238
  The Arizona Supreme Court read the report and 
used it in crafting their final decision in the case.  The report‟s influence on the 
case was widely known.  The Arizona Daily Citizen reported that the report 
“played no small part in upsetting the old Arizona ruling.”239  In his opinion, 
Justice Udall noted it “brands the decision in the Porter case as being 
discriminatory and recommends that suffrage be granted by the states of Arizona 
and New Mexico to their Indian citizens.”240  Undeniably, even the federal 
Executive Branch influenced the Arizona Supreme Court in this case.  
The 1931 article “The legal status of Indian suffrage in the United States” 
written by University of Arizona political science professor, N. D. Houghton, also 
had some bearing on the Arizona Supreme Court‟s decision in the trial.  Houghton 
maintained that the 1928 Porter v. Hall decision was largely based on whether it 
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was “good public policy” to grant voting rights to Native Americans living on 
reservations—a point originally made by Justice Ross in 1928.241  The 1948 court 
agreed with Justice Ross, that “good public policy” was irrelevant in a judicial 
court and should be left up to the determination of the legislative or executive 
branches, and that the only role of the judiciary branch was to interpret the State 
Constitution in this respect.
242
  “We concede,” Justice Udall wrote, “that very 
persuasive arguments may be advanced upon both sides of the “public policy” 
question, but we refuse to be drawn into the controversy as to the wisdom of 
granting suffrage to the Indians, our sole concern being whether the constitution, 
fairly interpreted, denies them the franchise.”243 
The status of appellant Frank Harrison as a World War II veteran 
contributed to the outcome of the 1948 Harrison v. Laveen trial.  During the war, 
the U.S. military drafted Harrison through the Selective Training and Service Act 
of 1940.  Once the war ended, the U.S. military honorably discharged Harrison.  
To elucidate the meaning of the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act, which did not 
specifically describe the citizenship status of American Indians born after the date 
of the act,  Congress passed the October 14, 1940 Nationality Act in order to 
clarify that “a person born in the United States to a member of an Indian tribe” 
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was an American citizen.
244
  In the opening brief of the Appellants, the plaintiff‟s 
team wrote, “We believe that Congress in 1940 (and perhaps prior to that date) 
effectively removed all restrictions from Indians by the enactment of the 
Nationality Code and endowed Indians living on a reservation with all the 
privileges of citizens, including the right to vote.”245  The 1940 Nationality Act 
and Selective Training and Service Act, the prosecution argued cleared up issues 
of Indian citizenship so that American Indians could be added to the draft.  The 
plaintiff‟s team claimed that Congress carefully worded the Nationality Act and 
the Selective Training and Service Act with the intention of further defining the 
citizenship status of reservation American Indians, and also for the objective of 
“terminat[ing] all relationship with reservation Indians, which might hinder their 
right to vote.”246  By cautiously defining reservation American Indian citizenship, 
Congress therefore, enabled all reservation Native Americans liable to military 
duty through the Selective Training and Service Act.
247
  The passage of these two 
acts in 1940, as a result, facilitated military service for thousands of American 
Indians like Harrison residing on reservations.  The plaintiff‟s team wrote in their 
opening brief, “It is well known that many reservation Indians served their 
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country faithfully in the late war.  We need go no further than to mention the 
reservation Indian at Iwo Jima (Mt. Suribachi).  What manner of „guardianship‟ 
prevents a man from voting and yet requires him to do military service.”248 
In response to the assertion that Harrison was a disenfranchised, honorable 
soldier, the defense replied, that other active duty soldiers in World War II were 
also not permitted to vote due to their underage status, and thus were, by law, 
non-sui juris.
249
  Unsurprisingly, this issue of underage citizens risking their lives 
as drafted soldiers would come up again decades later during the Vietnam War.  
In response, Congress added the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, changing the age requirement from twenty-one to eighteen in order 
to correct this injustice.  
The defense team again tackled the issue of disenfranchised American 
Indian veterans by adding, “Further, none of the veterans of the last war were 
compelled to return to the reservation and take up their tribal ways.  If they did so, 
they did so knowing what the effect would be.”250  This last statement of the 
defense team demonstrates a lingering subjugation of tribalism.  The “tribal ways” 
of returned American Indian veterans to reservations was a threat to 
Americanism.  Those veterans that returned to the tribalism of the reservation 
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after their integration into the American military demonstrated a conscious 
choice, claimed the defense, to disengage themselves from American society.  
Therefore, their return to the reservation halted any further attempt to assimilate 
them into American society.  The defense essentially contended that any returning 
American Indian veterans had the choice to leave the tribalism of the reservation 
behind and become full voting citizens or return to the reservation and remain 
subject to a continued wardship status that disenfranchised them.   
The Supreme Court Justices did not agree with the counterarguments of 
the defense about American Indian veterans.  Instead, they agreed with the 
plaintiff‟s argument that the intent of the 1940 Nationality Act was to define 
clearly Native American citizenship so that the United States government could 
draft young American Indian men for war through the Selective Training and 
Service Act.  Justice Udall wrote in his opinion, “we know that from our own 
State thousands of these native Americans served in the armed forces with pride 
and distinction, e. g., Ira Hamilton Hayes, a Pima Indian, participated in the 
epochal raising of the stars and stripes on Mt. Surabachi on Iwo Jima.”251  Despite 
the Court‟s clear recognition of the service of Native American veterans in their 
state, the voting status of American Indian veterans was not the persuading 
contention that determined the outcome of the case.  In order for the Justices to 
overrule a previous decision from their own court, they had to confront the one 
                                                 
251
 Harrison et al. v. Laveen, 5065, 5.  
 
117 
assertion that convinced that earlier court to make their ruling, which was that 
American Indians were “under guardianship” to the federal government, and 
therefore  ineligible to vote according to the Arizona State Constitution.  
The dispute over the guardianship issue was complex.  As the 1928 court 
did, the Justices first had to address the usage of the term in judicial precedent.  
Once again, the Court revisited the term‟s origin in the Cherokee v. Georgia trial.  
The Court agreed with Chief Justice Ross‟s judgment of the “loosely” interpreted 
term “under guardianship” since Chief Justice Marshall expressed it back in 1831.  
Referencing Felix S. Cohen’s Federal Handbook of Indian Law, the Court used 
the following citation in their opinion,  
Primarily in its original and most precise signification the term „ward‟ in 
the federal decisions and statutes has been applied (a) to tribes rather than 
to individuals, (b) as a suggestive analogy rather than as an exact 
description, (c) to distinguish an Indian tribe from a foreign state, and (d) 
as a synonym for „beneficiary of a trust‟ or „cestui que trust‟.  The failure 
to distinguish among these different senses in which the term „ward‟ has 
been so loosely used is responsible for a considerable amount of the 
existing confusion.
252
 
 
Just as Justice Ross contended in 1928, and as Felix Cohen wrote in his 
Handbook, the 1948 court agreed that Justice Marshall was making an analogy 
when he stated that that the relationship between the federal government and 
Native Americans “resembled a guardianship.”  Furthermore, the 1948 Justices 
concurred with Justice Ross‟s opinion that the framers of the Arizona State 
Constitution never had American Indians in mind when writing the clause “under 
                                                 
252
 Felix S. Cohen’s Federal Handbook of Indian Law quoted in Harrison et al. v. Laveen, 5065, 6. 
 
118 
guardianship” as a disqualification for the electorate.253  Furthermore, only the 
State of Arizona made the connection between Native Americans and 
guardianship through interpretation of their state election laws.  North Dakota‟s 
constitution had an identical disqualification for their electorate, and just as in 
Arizona, the State Supreme Court contested the interpretation of the statute in the 
1920 trial Swift v. Leach.  In that case, the court did not find that the 
“guardianship” clause in their Constitution applied to Native Americans, and 
subsequently allowed their American Indian citizens the right to vote.  The 1948 
Supreme Court agreed with Justice Ross that the Swift v. Leach decision was 
“good law.”254 
 Another piece of the guardianship puzzle was the interpretation of 
individuals as sui juris or non-sui juris.  In the Porter v. Hall trial, the majority 
found that the plaintiffs were not sui juris and thus “under guardianship” which 
prevented them from qualifying to vote.  After defining the meaning of sui juris 
from the third edition of Black's Law Dictionary, the 1948 court decided that 
according to their definition, the plaintiffs were sui juris for the simple reason that 
the plaintiffs could not have brought a complaint to court in their name if they 
                                                 
253
 Ibid.  
 
254
 Swift v. Leach, 45 N.D. 437, 178 N.W. 437; Harrison et al. v. Laveen, 5065, 6; McCool, Native 
Vote, 15.  
 
119 
were under guardianship.
255
  The prosecution made this point in their opening 
brief,  
If Porter (Indian) was not sui juris, then what business had he in bringing 
the case in his own name in the first place?  The generally accepted 
definition of „non sui juris‟ is that condition which, among other things, 
prevents a person from maintaining an action at law in his own name…No 
motion was made to bring in the „real party of interest‟ namely a 
„guardian.‟256 
 
The “real party of interest” or the supposed “guardian” of the Porter and Johnson 
in the 1928 case would have to have been the United States according to the 
ruling.  Justice Udall pointed out that the Department of Justice submitted a brief 
amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiff, and wrote that the federal government 
agency did so “to disclaim any intention to treat the plaintiffs as „persons under 
guardianship‟.  Certainly the state courts cannot make the United States a 
guardian against its will.”257 
The 1948 Supreme Court Justices were well aware of the effects a 
changing society had on this case.  Since the economic crisis of the 1930s and 
World War II, a handful of more liberal judicial rulings and legal modifications in 
Arizona had resulted in advancing the position of American Indians in the state.  
With the exception of voting rights, Native Americans on and off the reservation 
were slowly becoming more incorporated into the white-dominated society.  
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Moreover, the state, and not the federal government instituted the gradual 
adoption of American Indian civil rights in Arizona.  As Justice Udall pointed out 
in his opinion, the 1939 Arizona State Legislature authorized and encouraged 
reservation superintendents to officiate marriages and issue marriage licenses to 
Native Americans.  He further added that reservation Native Americans were also 
filing for divorce through the Superior Court, and their estates processed by 
probate courts.
258
  Justice Udall concluded, 
Avowedly the government's policy aims at the full integration of Indians 
into the political, social, and economic culture of the nation, and during 
the twenty years that have elapsed since the decision in the Porter case 
some significant changes have taken place in the legal position of the 
Indian which have a bearing upon the applicability of that decision to 
contemporary conditions.
259
 
To demonstrate the change of the legal status of Native Americans in Arizona, 
Justice Udall used a number of Arizona court cases that the plaintiff‟s team 
presented in their opening brief, which resulted in judicial decisions in favor of 
American Indian civil rights.   
 The first case both the plaintiff‟s team and Justice Udall offered as judicial 
evidence was the same case the 1928 plaintiff‟s team submitted; the 1928 Denison 
v. State trial of which Justice Lockwood reasoned a full-blooded Hopi Indian 
qualified as a juror, and had the legal status of sui juris.  Quoting the case‟s 
decision, the prosecution wrote in their opening brief, that the juror in question 
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was determined to have, “a sound mind and good moral character,” the necessary 
qualifications for a juror according to state law.
260
  The prosecution further 
pointed out the inconsistency of Justice Lockwood‟s rulings with respect to 
American Indian civil rights issues.  It was Justice Lockwood, they argued, who 
gave the ruling in the Denison v. State case, but in the Porter v. Hall trial just 
months later, he would determine Native Americans on reservations were non-sui 
juris.
261
  
 A 1935 state law prevented a Navajo from obtaining a hunting and fishing 
license because the law blatantly barred American Indians.  The Navajo, Cecil 
Begay, sued the State Game Warden, and the case went to the Arizona Supreme 
Court.  Justice Lockwood wrote the opinion for the case, Begay v. Sawtelle, and it 
was Justice Lockwood who determined that the current law, which stated, “no 
license shall be sold to any such Indian,” was unconstitutional and violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
262
  In their opening 
brief, the prosecution team for Harrison and Austin argued that if Native 
Americans could now by law acquire a hunting and fishing license and carry a 
gun, then how can they still be classified as non-sui juris or incompetent?
263
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In the 1914 Supreme Court trial, Fernandez v. State, the court ruled that 
reservation Indians were “competent witnesses” in a court of law.264  The 1943 
trial Bradley v. Arizona Corporation Commission granted a reservation American 
Indian the right to establish a freighting business on his reservation and obtain a 
permit to do so.  The court held that the original law was unconstitutional and 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  After reviewing the Appellants‟ discussion 
of these four cases in their opening brief, the Supreme Court agreed that prior 
court rulings tended to favor American Indian civil rights, apart from the Porter v. 
Hall trial.  Justice Udall wrote, “It will thus be seen that this court has liberally 
construed state laws (except insofar as granting the elective franchise is 
concerned) favorable to the civil rights of Indians along with all other citizens of 
the United States.”265   
After listing the requirements of a legal guardianship according to Arizona 
statutes, Justice Udall reasoned that neither of the plaintiffs nor any reservation 
American Indian could be classified as a ward, because the phrase “under 
guardianship” in the Arizona State Constitution was never intended to describe a 
class of people, but only individuals and through a judicial hearing.  Justice Udall 
stated, “This leads us to the conclusion that the framers of the constitution had in 
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mind situations where disabilities are established on an individual rather than a 
tribal basis.”266  Therefore, Udall concluded,  
We hold that the term "persons under guardianship" has no application to 
the plaintiffs or to the Federal status of Indians in Arizona as a class.  This 
conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the Federal constitutional 
question heretofore stated.  The majority opinion in the case of Porter v. 
Hall, supra, is expressly overruled in so far as it conflicts with our present 
holding.
267
 
  
Through this ruling, Justice Udall and the other Supreme Court Justices had 
finally given justice to disenfranchised Native Americans all across the state.   
In an interview with the Arizona Republic, Representative Harless 
exclaimed,  
The supreme court‟s decision is a major achievement for Arizona‟s Indian 
population and places them in a position which they should have held for 
many years.  I have always contended that if a person can be called upon 
to fight for his country, then he certainly has the right to take an active part 
in the government of that country.  That was one of the major arguments 
in this case.
268
  
The Arizona Republic‟s headline the day following the Supreme Court‟s ruling 
proclaimed in bold type, “COURT GRANTS INDIAN VOTE.”269  The Arizona 
Republic article estimated that the Court‟s decision would affect roughly fifty 
thousand Native Americans in the state.
270
  In actuality, the total number of 
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Native Americans over the age of 21 in Arizona in 1940 was approximately 
24,817, according to the United States Bureau of Census.
271
  The power of the 
American Indian vote could potentially exercise significant political influence in 
the Apache and Navajo counties in Arizona.
272
  The total populations of Native 
Americans in Apache and Navajo counties were 20,267 and 14,613 in 1950, 
respectively—far outnumbering the native populations in other counties.273  
Justice Udall served as either an attorney or judge in the Apache County 
Courthouse for over twenty-eight years.  The high numbers of Native American 
constituents in his home county certainly had a positive influence over his views 
on American Indian civil rights issues.  Congratulatory letters from friends and 
associates of Justice Udall began to pour into his office after the trial.  University 
of Arizona professor, N.D. Houghton wrote to Udall, “Needless to say, I am 
pleased with the decision…  Your opinion is most effectively and excellently 
done.”274  
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Dr. Clarence G. Salsbury the Superintendent of Ganado Mission also 
expressed his admiration for Udall, “You are congratulated on having the courage 
and the splendid common sense to snap the first big link in the chain of shameful 
discrimination against our Indian friends in Arizona.”  Salsbury continued, 
“Having overcome this greatest obstacle it should materially speed the day when 
the sham called wardship is completely eliminated, and our Indians assume the 
full privileges and responsibilities of a citizenship that now, thanks to your sound 
judgment, really means something to them.”275  A day later, Salsbury sent another 
letter requesting several copies of Justice Udall‟s opinion for distribution.  
Salsbury wrote that he intended to frame one of the copies for display in the 
Ganado high school, “so” he proclaimed, “that our students may never forget the 
eventful day that made them eligible for the franchise…”276  
Udall‟s church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, also 
recognized Justice Udall‟s opinion.  S. Eugene Flake of the Navajo-Zuni Mission 
in Gallup, New Mexico wrote to Udall,  “I only wish all our public servants, had 
the same good wholesome interest in the Indians.  I‟m sure tho [sic] that a few can 
make a decided ripple, that eventually grow into a tidal wave.  We can see the 
influence of the few who know what they are about, gradually swaying the public 
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opinion and I know that we will eventually win.”277  Most significantly, Justice 
Udall received a letter of thanks from Felix S. Cohen, the celebrated father of 
American Indian law.  Cohen proudly stated, “I have seldom read an opinion of 
any court which moved more lucidly or more logically from undeniable premises 
to inevitable conclusions, and at the same time expressed so well the basic 
sentiments of humanity, without which logic cannot move the judgement [sic] of 
mankind.”278  Many friends of the Indians privately celebrated Justice Udall‟s 
opinion as another victory in the battle for American Indian civil rights.  
In spite of the celebratory atmosphere, some local newspapers expressed a 
mix of apprehension and perhaps a sense of satisfaction that illiteracy would 
disqualify a large percentage of reservation American Indians from voting.  The 
Arizona Republic reported that an approximate eighty to ninety percent of the 
Native American population would probably not meet all the requirements for the 
electorate, due to high illiteracy rates.
279
  The Phoenix Gazette also reported the 
same information on July 17, 1948, of the impact illiteracy rates would have on 
the eligibility of Native Americans for the electorate, particularly on the Navajo 
reservation they added.  The newspaper additionally noted that the only further 
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way to block American Indians from voting was by state legislative action, and 
that an appeal to the United States Supreme Court was unlikely.  The article 
furthermore stated, “The situation has many aspects.  For example, an Indian can 
now vote for a sheriff in a county, but the same sheriff cannot arrest that Indian 
for a crime committed on a reservation.”280  The Tucson Daily Citizen reported 
that American Indians could now vote on laws, which may or may not affect them 
through initiative and referendum.  They also pointed out that it was currently 
possible for Native Americans to vote on tax laws, of which they were not 
susceptible to contribute.  The Tucson Daily Citizen added however, that 
American Indians could be subject to the state sales taxes if an executive order 
from the State Tax Commission found it necessary.  The paper also commented 
that with the increase of the new voting constituents to the electorate, the number 
of United States representatives could also increase.
281
  For reporting on the 
outcome of the trial, the press demonstrated a conservative slant, which in turn 
also represented the political pulse of many of their readers. 
Despite a clear air of trepidation in the local newspapers about the 
Supreme Court adding American Indians to the electorate, there was some 
celebration.  The Phoenix Gazette reported on July 17, 1948 that Amos L. Belone, 
a Navajo veteran from the United States Army‟s Okinawa campaign, father of 
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five and employee of the Navajo Ordinance Depot Hospital registered at the 
Coconino County Recorder‟s Office as a “„determined Republican.‟”282  Belone 
was reportedly the first Native American to take advantage of the Court‟s ruling 
to register to vote in the State of Arizona.
283
  Not only does this article report on 
the first Native American to register to vote, but it also uncovered a long-standing 
irony in the battle of voting rights.  In the 1928 voting rights case, politicians, and 
government officials were concerned that the Native Americans would vote en 
mass for Republicans due to their presumed ignorance.  The plaintiffs, Peter 
Porter and Rudolph Johnson, had attempted to register for the Democratic Party in 
1928, the same party that Frank Harrison and Harry Austin tried to join in 1948.  
Amos L. Belone mentioned above was a Republican, proving that Native 
Americans, like everyone else, are individuals with independent minds.  This 
article disproves the unfounded bias that Arizona officials had in the 1920s about 
the American Indian vote.   
The registration of Amos L. Belone to the electorate was a victory for 
American Indian rights in Arizona, but Native Americans would find many more 
trials and tribulations before they could even make it to the ballot box.  The 
largest challenge to overcome were imposed literacy tests—a method of 
disenfranchising thousands of uneducated people from all different backgrounds 
all over the state.  Quoting the Los Angeles Times in 1948, “the fight for full 
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Indian rights is far from over; but slowly the Indians are winning.”284  It indeed 
was a slow process.  Literacy tests were not suspended until 1965, when Congress 
passed the monumental Voting Rights Act.  The Voting Rights Act would earn its 
place as another win for American Indians civil rights.   
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CHAPTER 4 
JUSTICE ONCE AND FOR ALL? 
In 1948, the Arizona Supreme Court‟s decision that Native Americans 
were not “under guardianship” according to their interpretation of the Arizona 
State Constitution, affected other arenas in the state‟s relationship with its Native 
American constituency.  One arena was state-supported public assistance to 
Native Americans as promised by the Social Security Act of 1935.  The Social 
Security Act has been both one of the most supported and controversial acts since 
its passage during the Great Depression.  In Arizona in the 1940s, the issue 
surrounding the Social Security Act was whether the state would fund public 
assistance for Native Americans.   
At the start of World War II, government officials in Arizona debated if 
and what benefits for American Indians the state would pay from the Federal 
Social Security act.  After an inquiry from Ernest Victor, the Chairman of the San 
Carlos Tribal Council, Governor Osborn contacted Senator Carl Hayden on 
January 25, 1941 regarding the application of old age assistance to American 
Indians.  Senator Hayden responded that the Federal Social Security Act applied 
to American Indians, but that the State of Arizona “alone among the forty-eight 
states,” had “thus far refused to pay old age assistance and other Social Security 
benefits to Indians because such Indians are not considered by the officials who 
have been administering the Social Security program in Arizona to be part of the 
131 
general population.”285  The day after the ruling in the Harrison v. Laveen trial, 
the Arizona Republic reported that the Court‟s decision would fuel fire to the 
ongoing debate to provide public assistance to Native Americans.  The Arizona 
Republic acknowledged Arizona has continued to deny financial coverage for 
American Indians from the act,   “Arizona has based its refusal to accept this 
responsibility squarely upon the premise that reservation Indians are wards of the 
government and under guardianship.  Officials of the state department of social 
security and welfare expressed apprehension the decision may have a 
„tremendous‟ effect upon the outcome of the dispute.”286  The Arizona Daily Star 
reported on the matter, “there are, at this time, about 1255 cases of reservation 
Indians who are in need of benefits under one or another phase of the welfare 
laws which have been processed by the state, but which the state contends should 
be paid by the Indian service.  There will be many more cases.”287  The paper 
added, “The decision of the Supreme Court has removed one of the points on 
which the state argued that these Indians were charges of the federal government 
and therefore, as such, should look to the federal government for aid, and not to 
the state.”288  
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The following month, in August 1948, Royal D. Marks, attorney for the 
Hualapai Tribe, contacted Acting-Governor Daniel E. Garvey on the matter.  
According to Marks, Arizona apparently still continued to deny old age assistance 
to reservation American Indians.  The outcome of the recent Harrison v. Laveen 
trial just a month earlier prompted Marks to petition to Governor Garvey on 
behalf of the Hualapai Tribe.  Marks argued that since the Supreme Court 
decision allowing American Indians to vote, “there is no longer any excuse for 
denying the Indian relief, who meets the statutory requirements for assistance 
under the Social Security set up.”  Marks further asserted, “The Indians, who are 
citizens of this State, deserve as much consideration, and I think a great many 
people will say more consideration, as any other citizens of this State.”289  
Governor Garvey quickly reacted to Mark‟s concerns and called a special session 
in the Arizona legislature in September 1948 on the matter.
290
  
That month, Arizona‟s refusal to pay for old age assistance and other 
Social Security benefits became nationally known.  The Los Angeles Times 
reported that both Arizona and New Mexico denied their American Indian 
constituents any assistance, the newspaper reported, “But discriminations and 
deprivations, however, are by no means ended by these victories.  In Arizona and 
New Mexico the Indians have yet to secure the same Social Security and old age 
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benefits that other citizens of those States enjoy.”291  Felix Cohen acknowledged 
the unfair stance of the State of Arizona towards its American Indian population 
in his Handbook of Federal Indian Law.  Cohen proclaimed,  
Some state administrators are unaware that Indians maintaining tribal 
relations or living on reservations are citizens, or mistakenly assume they 
are supported by the Federal Government, and deny them relief.  This 
discrimination in state aid has made more acute the economic distress of 
many Indians who are poor and live below any reasonable standard of 
health and decency.
292
 
 
Sidestepping allegations of discrimination and violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Arizona, and New Mexico argued that public assistance was a 
federal responsibility due to its special guardianship over Native Americans.  
Furthermore, the two states refused to pay their share of public aid to American 
Indians, because they argued that their state budgets could not afford to assist 
financially the large numbers of Native Americans in their states.
293
   
The debate over federal versus state public assistance to American Indians 
was blown wide open in 1947 when the Arizona State Department of Public 
Welfare stood its ground and refused to pay its share as designated by the Social 
Security Act of 1935.  The Commissioner for Social Security held special 
hearings in both states in February 1949 to resolve the issue.  The hearings 
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eventually led to the creation of Public Law 474.
294
  Finally, in 1950, the federal 
government conceded the debate over whose responsibility it was to provide 
public assistance to Native Americans in Arizona and New Mexico.  On July 1, 
Congress enacted Public Law 474, which provided public assistance to the Navajo 
and Hopi tribes in Arizona.  The law stipulated that the federal government would 
pay eighty percent of Arizona‟s obligation in addition to the allocated percentage 
the federal government was already paying.
295
   
In 1953, Arizona again attempted to rid itself of its financial responsibility 
in aiding needy American Indians.  That year, the State filed a lawsuit against 
Oveta Culp Hobby, the Federal Social Security Administrator.
296
  In the trial, 
Arizona v. Hobby, the State of Arizona contended that it was not required to 
provide financial assistance to reservation American Indians, because according 
to the State, “no assistance shall be payable under such plan to any person of 
Indian blood while living on a federal Indian reservation.”297  This claim was yet 
another in the long history of using federal American Indian guardianship as an 
excuse to refuse rights and aid to Native Americans.  The Department of Justice 
and the Association of American Indian Affairs intervened on behalf of the 
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defendant, denying the State‟s assertion.  Ultimately, the case was appealed to the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia and dismissed based on 
the grounds that Arizona‟s stance was discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
298
   
Despite the ruling of the 1948 Harrison v. Laveen trial, which gave voting 
rights to reservation American Indians, political discrimination against the 
minority group lingered.  The State simply did not believe it was obligated to pay 
for the financial assistance of a group of minorities that had had federal care for 
nearly a century.  Indeed, Arizona and New Mexico had the second and third 
largest populations of American Indians after Oklahoma, and their share of funds 
would be greater than that of other states, but that still did not give them the right 
to deny aid to a minority group who desperately needed it.  This element of social 
security denial in American Indian civil rights also demonstrates a conservative 
battle between states rights versus the federal government.  The actions of 
Arizona and New Mexico suggest obstinacy to federal law.  Furthermore, as a 
relatively new state whose territorial period at this point was longer than its 
statehood, this account over social security suggests that Arizona was stuck in the 
vestiges of a territorial mentality that the federal government handled the funding 
of measures such as these.  Whatever the reason for Arizona‟s actions, it was still 
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an unwarranted form of racial discrimination against Native Americans carried 
out by a state government.  
Racial discrimination or minority discrimination occurred in the handling 
of elections in Arizona as well.  State and county governments used old and new 
methods to outright disenfranchise Native Americans or dilute their collective 
vote.  Since Native Americans, through their sheer numbers could potentially 
wield enough voting power to make effective political change, state, county, and 
local governments in Arizona used different methods to maintain the current 
power structure.  These tactics ultimately suppressed the native voice in political 
participation.  The discriminatory schemes to disenfranchise minorities in Arizona 
were a means to continue white racial dominance in the state.  This form of 
racism was also transparent with “Jim Crow” laws in the Deep South, which 
degraded and humiliated African Americans into second-rate citizens.  
The Fifteenth Amendment declared that suffrage could “not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”299  Once African Americans received the right to 
vote through the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment by Congress on February 
26, 1869, voter discrimination in the form of literacy tests, poll taxes, all-white 
primary elections, and voter “intimidation” largely contributed to a low turnout of 
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African American voters during elections.
300
  The Twenty-fourth Amendment 
abolished poll taxes in 1964, but the other types of voter discrimination lingered 
in some states, mostly in the Deep South.   
The 1965 Voting Rights Act was a product of the Civil Rights era.  The 
act was primarily a reaction by Congress to the continued racism toward African 
Americans since Reconstruction; however, its passage revealed that other states 
outside of the Deep South had similar discriminatory measures within their 
electoral systems that aimed to disenfranchise other minority groups, like 
American Indians.
301
  In Arizona, some counties targeted Native Americans and 
Mexican Americans at the polls.  The main discriminatory problem in select 
Arizona counties before and after the 1965 Voting Rights Act was the literacy 
test.
302
  
 When Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965, one of its important 
measures was its suspension of literacy tests based on their discriminatory nature 
to both non-literate and literate American citizens.  Specifically, in Arizona the 
English-language literacy test denied suffrage to Arizona citizens whose primary 
language was not English alluding to a number of American Indians and Mexican 
Americans.  
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 The United States Commission on Civil Rights submitted a 
comprehensive report, titled, “The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After,” in 1975 
on the effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act since 1965.  A larger part of the 
report was its discussion of the use of literacy tests, and the temporary 
mechanisms of the Voting Rights Act to block their usage.  The report explained 
that section four of the Voting Rights Act defined a “covered jurisdiction” or a 
jurisdiction “made subject to the act‟s remedies” as a county, parish, or town of a 
State that “used a test or device and had less than 50 percent turnout in the 1964 
or 1968 election.”303  Arizona had four counties found to be “covered 
jurisdictions” after the enforcement of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.  In 1965 
and early 1966, the counties of Apache, Coconino, Navajo and Yuma were 
discovered to use “tests or devices” to disenfranchise potential voters.  Apache, 
Coconino, and Navajo counties sued for exemption of its “covered jurisdiction” 
status in the District Court for the District of Columbia arguing that they had “not 
used a test or device in a discriminatory manner for 5 (since 1970, 10) years.”  
Those three counties were successful in their suit to exempt themselves, but 
Yuma County still obtained the “covered jurisdiction” status.  The 1970 Voting 
Rights Act amendments further investigated the use of “tests or devices in a 
discriminatory manner” in Arizona and found that the Apache, Coconino, and 
Navajo were “re-covered” and the additional counties of Cochise, Mohave, Pima, 
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Pinal, and Santa Cruz.  The 1975 Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
stated,  
It is important to note, as the list of covered jurisdictions shows, that the 
special coverage provisions of the Voting Rights Act reach into every 
corner of the United States…Discrimination in voting is not limited to the 
South: the problems encountered by Spanish speaking persons and Native 
Americans in covered jurisdictions are not dissimilar from those 
encountered by Southern blacks, and the Voting Rights Act protects their 
rights as well. 
In Arizona, the number of registered Navajo voters in Apache County increased 
by 19 percent between the 1972 primary election and the 1974 general election 
due to “suspension of literacy tests and energetic efforts by Navajo leaders.”304  In 
addition, the registration rates in the total number of precincts on reservations 
increased by 7.5 percent between those two election years.
305
  In Coconino 
County alone, which contains a portion of the Navajo reservation, registration 
rates on reservation precincts jumped from 10.8 percent in 1970 to 23.5 percent in 
1974, with a large increase to the registration rate after literacy tests were 
suspended.  Commissioner Frankie M. Freeman of the 1975 report recommended 
that Congress should outright eradicate literacy tests instead of pushing forward 
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more ten-year suspensions.
306
  In 2006, Congress voted to extend the temporary 
provisions like the suspension on literacy tests for another twenty-five years.
307
 
 After the suspension of literacy tests, Native American representation also 
increased.  Navajos were elected to school boards on the reservation, the first 
American Indian county supervisor was elected in 1972, and three state 
representatives of Native American descent were elected in 1974.
308
  Tom Shirley 
the Navajo elected to the Apache County Board of Supervisors in 1972 endured a 
lawsuit by his opponent claiming Shirley was unqualified for the position, 
because of “his immun[ity] from civil process while on the Navajo Reservation 
and he does not own any taxable property.”309  The Arizona Supreme Court who 
heard the case disagreed with the opponent‟s claim, and dismissed the case.310 
 Furthermore, the report observed that Arizona‟s “strict” voter registration 
purging statutes hindered voter turnout of Native Americans.  According to the 
report, Arizona law required the cancellation of voter registration, if a voter had 
not voted in the last two years.  The County Recorder‟s Office then mailed notices 
to their delinquent voters of their impending voter registration cancellation, and 
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informed them to respond within two months.  After 1972, attrition rates were 
high in Apache and Coconino Counties.  Therefore, thirty-six percent and twenty-
five percent of the registered voters in those two counties, respectively, had their 
voter registrations revoked in 1974 by the County Recorder‟s Office—this 
accounts for the purging of over six thousand voter registrations of which the 
report claims were mostly Navajo Indians.
311
  The report also noted that a delay in 
mailing the notice of cancellation, difficulty of obtaining mail due to weather, and 
English-illiteracy of many Navajos contributed to the high number of purged 
registrations from this tribal community.
312
 
 Another issue relating to minority voting rights in Arizona and elsewhere 
was the requirement of re-registration.  According to the report, Arizona required 
a complete re-registration of voters in 1970, which removed large numbers of 
Native Americans and Mexican Americans from the General Register.
313
  The 
report concluded, “the process [of re-registration] places a substantial burden on 
the minority voter, who has often succeeded in registering only after overcoming 
many obstacles.”314 
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 Poor policy of informing voters of the change in location of polling places 
also contributed to lower turnout rates among minorities.
315
  The report stated the 
damaging effects of this particular problem, “When a polling place change is not 
publicized, many voters go to the wrong place to vote.  Told to go somewhere 
else, many see it as a runaround and may not vote at all.”316  Furthermore, the 
report added, that any notice of a polling place change in Arizona was in 
English—useless to those voters who had a primary language other than 
English.
317
  Those that did know the location of the polling centers in the 1972 
election in Apache County found them overcrowded with long lines and a wait of 
over two and half hours.
318
  The county finally added eleven new polling centers 
to the reservation by 1974, but as the reports affirmed, “…the county assigned 
people to precincts arbitrarily and without firsthand knowledge of the location of 
residence.”319  Thus, a new deterrent for some Navajos in Apache County was the 
long distance to get to the new polling centers the county had just established.  
In 1975, when the report was submitted, Arizona had no statute requiring 
bilingual voting materials for Spanish-speaking voters or Native Americans 
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whose primary language was something other than English.
320
  After the 
submission of this report, Congress enacted Section 203 or the Language Minority 
Provision of the Voting Rights Act in 1975.  Section 203 stipulates that states 
provide election materials in languages other than English.
321
  Since 1975, 
Arizona has had statewide coverage for Spanish, and twelve counties are required 
to provide voting materials for American Indian languages.
322
  In 1974, Arizona 
banned straight-party voting after promising the Department of Justice it would 
provide “adequate assistance” to its minority voters and “sufficient time would be 
allowed for voting.”323  In 1988, the Department of Justice sued the State of 
Arizona for providing inadequate voting materials and procedures in the Navajo 
language in the Apache and Navajo Counties, as required by the Language 
Minority Provisions of the Voting Rights Act.  Ultimately, the case was settled 
out of court when the State of Arizona agreed to start the Navajo Language 
Election Information Program.
324
  The 1992 amendment to the Voting Rights Act, 
known as the Voting Rights Language Assistance Act ordered states to provide 
voting materials in languages other than English when a county of ten thousand or 
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more had a population of minorities who were “limited English proficient.”325  
Further provisions of the Amendment required voting materials in native 
languages on reservations if five percent qualified for the assistance even though 
the five percent may be disproportional to the county‟s total population—this was 
an important measure for reservations that spanned more than one county.
326
  In 
2006, Congress extended the temporary provisions of the Voting Rights Act, 
including Section 203, for another twenty-five years.
 327
  
Vote dilution was another complex problem for minorities.  The report 
defined vote dilution as, “arrangements by which the vote of a minority elector is 
made to count less than the vote of a white.”328  The redistricting of voting 
precincts and voting regulations are the primary causes of vote dilution.
329
  The 
1970 redistricting plan for Arizona had a two-fold problem.  The first issue was 
the fact that the 1970 redistricting plan did not use current census data and 
presupposed that the number of registered voters in a precinct was proportional to 
the number of people in that same district.
330
  Since minorities were generally 
under registered compared to whites, powerfully small, predominately-white 
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districts were formed even though the law stipulated that each district contain the 
same percentage of population.
331
  
Second, the State Legislature originally split the Navajo reservation into 
three districts, diluting the Navajo vote, and giving the Navajo Nation zero 
chances of electing a Navajo representative.
332
  The plan of dividing the Navajo 
reservation occurred because of an incumbency rule and the desire to make 
districts “politically homogenous.”333  The incumbency rule required there be no 
fewer number of districts than the number of currently incumbent legislators; 
ensuring that the federal mandate could not unseat a currently seated elected 
official.  The United States District Court ruled that the 1972 redistricting plan 
could not break up the Navajo reservation into three districts, but insisted the plan 
leave it as one.
334
  Once, the Navajo reservation became one voting district in 
1972, the district immediately elected a Navajo representative to two of the open 
seats in that election, one State senator and one of the two State representatives.  
In 1974, all three offices had Navajo elected officials.
335
   
Another issue over redistricting in Apache County arose in 1973 over the 
redrawing of County Supervisor districts.  The 1973 Goodluck v. Apache County 
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United States District Court case determined that the county had disproportionally 
divided the county into three districts with uneven population numbers, thus 
violating the provisions of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth 
Amendment.
336
  District 3 had an overwhelmingly high population of 26,700 
people in comparison to District 2 containing 3,900 citizens and 1,700 in District 
1, and 23,600 of the 26,700 counted constituents in District 3 were Native 
Americans.
337
  Therefore, the County had diluted the Native American vote in 
District 3, based on the justification from the County that American Indians were 
not citizens according the United States Constitution and not permitted to vote, 
because they did not pay taxes.
338
  The District Court did not buy the defendant‟s 
claim that Native Americans were not citizens, and ruled against the defendants 
ordering the county to redistrict according to the equal standards of the Voting 
Rights Act.
339
  The United States Commission on Civil Rights concluded before 
the ruling in the Goodluck v. Apache County trial, “Thus 10 years after the Voting 
Rights Act enabled most Navajos in Apache County to begin to participate in the 
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political process, their own county government is trying to exclude them from 
it.”340   
The voting rights of Native Americans and other minorities had greatly 
improved since the days of literacy tests, inadequate voting materials and policies, 
and vote dilution problems in the ten years after the 1965 Voting Rights Act.  
Finally, the power of the native vote was beginning to be noticed in Arizona.  The 
report of the Commission of Civil Rights, however, warned, “the very real gains 
that have been made, however, must not be allowed to obscure the persistence of 
racial discrimination in the electoral process.”341  In 1981, Forty-eight percent of 
the American Indian voting population was reported to be registered in 
jurisdictions covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.  Therefore, the 1981 
report concluded that minority groups are “considerably underrepresented” in 
states like Arizona where there are high percentages of minorities.
342
  Recent 
programs in the last two decades like the Navajo Language Election Program and 
the “Get the Vote Out” campaign have had successes.  Apache County officials 
reported an increase of twenty-five percent in Navajo voter turnout between 2000 
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and 2004.
343
  At the very least, minorities now have the power to take legal action 
against injustices in the electoral process thanks to measures from the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 and its later amendments.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
In 1982, when Frank Harrison was still living, the Intertribal Council of 
Arizona and the Arizona Commission of Indian Affairs honored him during a 
special recognition event for Native American voting rights, and presented to him 
an honorary plaque.  The day was filled with celebration as representatives from 
different tribal communities and Arizona elected officials gathered together in 
honor of the monumental achievement he represented.  Frank Harrison, the 
Yavapai Indian whose perseverance and determination called upon him to 
challenge the suppressive status quo was asked by the event‟s coordinators to give 
a speech.  His address was the last given to an eager crowd at the Salt River Pima 
Maricopa Indian Community gym that day.  Everyone wanted to know what the 
star of the day had to say about his achievement for generations to come of 
American Indian citizens in Arizona.  Harrison calmly walked up to the podium 
and spoke into the microphone two words, “Thank you.”  With incredible 
modesty, Harrison left the stage.
344
   
On July 15, 2007, sixty years to the day after the Arizona Supreme Court 
finally granted voting rights to the state‟s American Indian citizens, Governor 
Janet Napolitano declared the day, Arizona Native American Right To Vote Day.  
The proclamation recognized all the notable characters of this incredible story, 
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including Frank Harrison and Harry Austin.  The final statement of the 
proclamation declared, “WHEREAS, although Arizona law now recognizes the 
right of Native American citizens of Arizona to vote in State elections, it remains 
vital that we work together to ensure that every eligible voter is able to exercise 
this most fundamental right.”345  Every year on July 15, the Fort McDowell 
Yavapai Nation hosts a commemoration event in honor of the day‟s importance to 
American Indian communities across the state, and to celebrate the triumphs of 
their two beloved tribal members, Frank Harrison and Harry Austin.
346
  
The story of Native American voting rights in Arizona is yet another 
swing in the oscillating pendulum of American Indian civil rights.  In our state 
alone, native rights have been subjugated to controversial battles reflected in court 
cases and federal and state legislation.  Complex factors contributed to a final 
success in 1948 during the Harrison v. Laveen trial, which determined suffrage 
for all American Indians in Arizona.  Since the end of the nineteenth century 
American Indian citizenship has been a contested issue in United States 
governmental policy.  Finally, in 1924 Congress authorized the Indian Citizenship 
Act making all American Indians born or naturalized in the United States, 
American citizens.  The “Indian Question,” however was not resolved and the 
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peculiar dual citizenship status of American Indians continued to attract negative 
connotations about the validity of the legal status of Native Americans.   
Arguably, the Indian Citizenship Act was yet another action by the federal 
government to impose the assimilation of Native Americans into mainstream 
American society, yet the guarantee of voting rights—the one true aspect of a 
democratic society was intentionally not included into the statute.  Thus, the 
States had the authority to determine the voting status of its Native American 
constituents.  Most states granted this privilege to American Indians with the 
passage of the Indian Citizenship Act, but two states, Arizona and New Mexico, 
denied this fundamental right until 1948—an astonishing twenty-four years after 
the enactment of the Indian Citizenship Act.  
After Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act in 1924, Arizona 
lawmakers, with the urging of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, initially accepted,  
generally speaking, the stance that American Indians were entitled to vote in 
Arizona, but that view eroded as the first general election drew near in which 
Native Americans could have any political influence.  Peter Porter and Rudolph 
Johnson, two Pima Indians attempted to register to vote in the Casa Grande 
precinct, because they believed that it was their fundamental right to do so, since 
they were new citizens of the United States.  The County Recorder disagreed, and 
a legal conflict ensued over whether the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act gave 
American Indians the authority to vote.   
152 
 The paternalistic decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in 1928, opined 
that the legal status of Native Americans on reservations as wards of the federal 
government deemed them ineligible to vote based on one phrase in the Arizona 
State Constitution, which disallowed citizens “under guardianship” to vote.  
Ironically, the same court ruled just months earlier that Native Americans had the 
competency and independence of person to sit on a jury of their peers.  Arizona 
law was as unclear about the legal status of Native Americans as was mainstream 
thinking.  The 1928 Arizona Supreme Court ruling did however degrade the 
citizenship status of Native Americans—specifically those residing on 
reservations, as second-class.  Just four years after finally receiving citizenship 
rights by the federal government, the State of Arizona determined its American 
Indian constituency as subaltern citizens.  
The challenge to Native American voting rights in 1928 was a direct result 
of white government officials trying to maintain the current political and social 
power structure.  Representatives from the Arizona Democratic party, the 
dominant party in Arizona the 1920s, feared that Native Americans en mass 
would vote for the opposing Republican Party.  Some Democrats formed a racial 
stigma of Native Americans as too “ignorant” to make independent choices other 
than the Republican incumbents.  Secondly, the threat of enfranchising such a 
large minority population of American Indians could have potentially unbalanced 
the social and political power of white Americans in the state.  The ramifications 
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of enfranchising American Indians were too great, and the State of Arizona used 
the judicial system to squash any hope for American Indian suffrage that year.   
  Gradually the legal and social status of Native Americans changed in 
Arizona over the next two decades.  The Depression of the 1930s and the 
Administration of liberal-thinking John Collier in the Bureau of Indian Affairs set 
a new course of mainstream attitudinal changes towards Native Americans and 
American Indian affairs.  Specifically, the Indian New Deal and the Indian 
Reorganization Act established further competency for tribal governments to 
handle their own affairs. 
The catalyst of World War II finally opened the door for American Indian 
civil rights in Arizona.  Native Americans, like all Americans of different racial 
backgrounds joined in the war effort sacrificing their lives and their resources for 
a greater national cause.  Returned Native American veterans like Ira Hayes 
received a welcoming wave of respect and admiration from white people all over 
the country, and American Indians reaped the benefits of yet another mainstream 
attitudinal change towards their ethnic group.  By 1948, the outdated Porter v. 
Hall ruling disenfranchising Native Americans in Arizona did not seem so fair, 
especially when these patriotic heroes had given their lives for America.  
During the 1940s, the Democratic Party, by this time with the presidency 
of Franklin Delano Roosevelt had experienced another political realignment, 
making the party progressively more liberal both in social and fiscal policy.  After 
the Democratic Party began using more liberal approaches to governmental 
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policy, it was only a matter of time before another challenge to American Indian 
disenfranchisement would restart the discussion on the legitimacy of the twenty-
year judicial ruling.  American Indian civil rights groups, like the National 
Congress for American Indians, looked for a Native American veteran willing to 
stand up to the challenge of battling for voting rights through the Arizona judicial 
system.  The Committee on Civil Rights established through an executive order of 
the Truman administration, criticized Arizona and New Mexico for their 
continued disenfranchisement of Native Americans—an influence on the 1948 
Harrison v. Laveen trial that came straight from the top.  The Department of 
Justice, the Department of the Interior, the National Congress of American 
Indians and the American Civil Liberties Union all filed briefs of amicus curiae in 
support of Frank Harrison and Harry Austin‟s suit for voting rights.  Felix S. 
Cohen, American Indian civil rights activist and celebrated father of American 
Indian law also provided his support to the cause.  The unanimous decision of the 
1948 Arizona Supreme Court to overturn its previous ruling was extraordinary, 
and resulted in the enfranchisement of generations of American Indians in 
Arizona to come.  
With so many elements gelling at once, it was inevitable that Native 
Americans would finally obtain suffrage in Arizona after twenty years of political 
suppression, but the path to get there was challenging to say the least.  The 1948 
ruling had its impact in other civil rights issues.  Native Americans in New 
Mexico were also granted voting rights in the months after the Harrison v. Laveen 
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case—the Arizona trial certainly had influenced the New Mexico State Supreme 
Court in deciding in favor of the plaintiff in the Trujillo v. Garvey trial.
347
  
Finally, after fifteen years of the State of Arizona‟s refusal to pay public 
assistance to American Indians living on reservations, the federal government 
stepped in and made it happen.    
Even though American Indians had the right to vote, they did not 
necessarily have the means to do so.  Voter discrimination was an abhorrent 
problem of the Civil Rights era, and the 1965 Voting Rights Act signed into law 
under the Johnson administration effectively put an end to the unfair treatment of 
minorities during the electoral process.  Literacy tests, vote dilution tactics, 
registration purges, inadequate voting materials and policies, and intimidation 
were all methods used by whites to suppress the minority vote.  The Voting 
Rights Act in tandem with the 1964 Civil Rights Act effectively abolished “Jim 
Crow” laws in the Deep South.  However, the enforcement of the Voting Rights 
Act revealed that voter discrimination was rampant in other non-South states and 
with other minority groups.  In Arizona, Native Americans and Mexican or 
Hispanic Americans were intentionally disenfranchised by one or more of the 
methods stated above.  After several amendments to the law and strong 
enforcement by the Department of Justice, many of the voter discrimination issues 
have been resolved, but some remain to this day.   
                                                 
347
 For more information about the story of Native American voting rights in New Mexico and the 
Trujillo v. Garvey trial, see Carol Ann Venturini, The Fight for Indian Voting Rights in New 
Mexico, (master's thesis, Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico, 1993). 
 
156 
Perhaps these issues of political discrimination towards American Indians 
in Arizona is the result of  non-native government officials acknowledging the 
significant political power Native Americans can wield if all their votes are 
counted.  It is estimated that the twenty-two tribal communities own twenty-eight 
percent of the land in Arizona.  Conceivably, the growing economic power of 
Arizona tribes due to gaming could translate into political power.  The political 
power of Native American tribal communities affects the control of numerous 
environmental resources, like water, within the State of Arizona.  The right to 
vote for all Arizonans ultimately affects the political power of those managing 
those resources.  
Voter discrimination is still a problem today in multiple states across the 
nation.  Currently, voter registration purges, redistricting problems, restrictive 
voter registration rules, ineffective ballot electronic systems, and limiting voter 
identification requirements all threaten to dilute or disenfranchise the minority 
vote.
348
  It is estimated that some five million Americans in a number of states, 
mostly minorities, will be affected detrimentally by recently enacted voting 
restrictions.
349
  This current issue of minority discrimination affects all 
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27, 2011). 
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Jeanine Plant-Chirlin and Andrew Goldston, "Study: New Voting Restrictions May Affect More 
than Five Million," Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law , October 3, 2011, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/study_new_voting_restrictions_may_affect_more_
than_five_million/ (accessed October 27, 2011).  
  
157 
Americans.  To paraphrase Felix S. Cohen: Even the disenfranchisement of the 
smallest minority only makes our democracy weaker.  The freedom to participate 
politically in the government that represents us is a fundamental building block of 
our country, and without this right, we have no foundation.
350
  In Frank Harrison‟s 
own words, “Well that‟s one thing we all look for, freedom.  We don‟t think about 
fighting each other, from now on we know better.  Well what I hope for is to help 
each other and get along.”351  
                                                 
350
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